VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Janno Pajo

MINOR PLAYERS IN A MAJOR GAME – THE SUCCESS OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY AS MEDIATORS

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Supervisor Gerda Jakštaitė, PhD

Defended prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis

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SANTRAUKA

Ištisus dešimtmečius Švedija ir Norvegija, santykinai mažos valstybės tarptautinėje bendruomenėje, sugebėjo sėkmingai tarpininkauti ir spręsti iškilusius konfliktus tarptautinėse derybose. Realizmo tarptautinių santykių teorijos šalininkai teigia, jog procesus pasaulyje lemia didžiosios galybės. Nepaisant to, dėl tam tikrų priežasčių, mažosios galybės, kaip ir šiame baigiamajame darbe tyrinėjamos valstybės, įsitvirtino tarptautinėje arenoje kaip patikimi ir įtakingi veikėjai, ženkliai prisidedantys prie tarptautinių santykių gerinimo. Magistro darbe analizuojama Švedijos ir Norvegijos tarpininkavimo (angl. mediation) sėkmė. Tiksliau, gilinamasi į šių šalių sėkmingą, tačiau tuo pačiu metu ir sudėtingą tarpininkavimo vaidmenį tarptautiniuose taikos procesuose. Tyrimo objektas yra tarpininko atrankos procedūra, kai tarpininkavo Švedija ar Norvegija, o šio baigiamojo darbo tikslas yra atsakyti į pagrindinius klausimus, kodėl ir kaip šioms valstybėms pavyko užimti minėtas pozicijas tarptautinėje arenoje. Tam tikslui baigiamajame darbe yra naudojamiempirinis ir aiškinamasis (priežastinis) tyrimo tipai. Teorinėje darbo dalyje yra gilinamasi į viešosios diplomatijos, vaidmenų teoriją bei socialinį konstruktyvizmą. Darbe buvo naudojami du tyrimo metodai: abstrakcija ir atvejo analizė, siekiant pritaikyti teorines žinias Švedijos ir Norvegijos vaidmens ir jų, kaip tarptautinių taikdarių, statuso analizei bei rasti atsakymus į tyrimo metu iškeltus klausimus. Tyrimo rezultatai buvo gauti, remiantis teorine darbo dalimi ir atlikta empirine analize, kurios padėjo nustatyti pagrindines sąlygas, lėmusias šių valstybių sėkmę. Sėkmingam darbo tikslo įgyvendinimui, turėjo būti įvykdyti šie uždaviniai: aptarti pagrindines teorines perspektyvas; išanalizuoti tarpininkavimą kaip konflikto sprendimo būdą, aptarti tarpininkavimui būdingas savybes, įskaitant ir pagrindinius bruožus, kuriais turi pasižymėti tarpininko vaidmenį, atliekančios šalys; išanalizuoti kitų mokslininkų atliktus tyrimus ir atlikti Švedijos ir Norvegijos, kurios buvo atrinktos kaip tarpininkės taikos procesuose, atvejo analizes; nustatyti sąlygas, lėmusias šių valstybių sėkmę, bei išsiaiškinti kaip buvo sukurtas jų, kaip tarpininkių, vaidmuo. Darbe buvo naudojamas kokybinis tyrimo metodas, kurio metu buvo atliekama dokumentų analizė bei diskurso analizė, taip pat naudojami tokie teoriniai metodai, kaip abstrakcija, aprašymas bei analizė. Pagrindiniai tyrimo rezultatai ir išvados atskleidžia priežastis, dėl kurių Švedija ir Norvegija buvo sėkmingai pasirinktos tarpininkių vaidmenims, be kita ko, šios šalys sistemingai formavo savo identitetą, kurdamos taikių ir neutralių valstybių įvaizdį, kurios nori ir gali skleisti taiką visame pasaulyje.

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ABSTRACT

For decades Sweden and Norway have managed to be mediators in major conflict negotiations, while at the same time being relatively minor states within the international community. According to realist point of view, bigger powers would do as they want and decide the order and faith of the world. For some reason, though, small powers, like the states of the current study, have been influential in international scene, shaping the relations of the world for the better. The master thesis analyses the success of Sweden and Norway as mediators. More specifically, the success of being often asked to fill a challenging and prestigious mediating role in international peace processes. The object of the research is the mediator´s selection procedure when negotiations were carried through with the help by Sweden or Norway, as the aim is to find answers to a puzzle, why and how these states have been so successful getting such role on the international stage. The research type is therefore positive, empirical and explanatory (causal). The theoretical approach is based on public diplomacy and role theory, including social constructivism. The research model is a case study and the goal is to apply the theory to the cases of Sweden´s and Norway´s role and status as international peacemakers. With the help of theoretical approach and empirical analysis, list of conditions are presented as the results of the study - why these states have been successful. In order to reach the results, following tasks had to be fulfilled during the study: introducing the main theoretical perspectives; explore mediation as a conflict resolution method, its unique features, including what capabilities are needed to fulfil the role; analyzing case studies of Sweden´s and Norway´s selection as mediator´s in peace processes; concluding with the list of conditions for their success and how their role as mediators has been built. Methodological approach to the research is qualitative, using methods of document analysis, discourse analysis, while also theoretical methods like abstraction, analysis and description are used. Key results and conclusions show the reasons Sweden and Norway have been successfully selected for the role, including that they have for already two centuries systematically built their identity and status as peaceful and neutral states, they want and have the capacity to spread peace around the world.

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INTRODUCTION

In August 1993 the Prime Minister of Norway announced being closely involved as a mediator during secret negotiations between Israel and Palestine, resulting in an agreement, later called as Oslo Peace Accords. In early 2000's Norwegian representatives were approached by Sri Lankan Kumaratunga government in order to facilitate negotiations and help to solve a long-lasting violent conflict between the conflicting parties. In March 2018 the Foreign Minister of North Korea visited and might return to Sweden for negotiations in an ongoing conflict in Korean Peninsula. According to realist point of view, bigger powers would do as they want and decide the order and faith of the world.[1] Even though multilateral organizations are built on an idea that states are equal, both formal and informal rules serve to institutionalize the interests of great powers. For some reason, though, smaller powers, like the states of the current study, have been influential in international scene as peacemakers, shaping the relations of the world for the better. How did it happen that Norway and Sweden are being involved as mediators in conflicts that have not only regional but global implications? Current research is carried through to find out why and what are the reasons for their success to be in such position.

Novelty, relevance of the topic, problem and questions

The world is full of conflicts and sometimes, not to let the differences get out of hand, a helping hand is needed between the fighting parties. By someone who can view outside the narrow roles of assertive parties and help to see at options and possibilities for solution from aside. In order to make the difference, that outside party cannot just be anyone, but must be approved by both sides. But to whom do the opposing sides turn to take on the task? Not everyone is allowed to step into that delicate role. Some actors in the international scene seem to take all the honors when a conflict negotiations facilitating is needed. Conventional understanding would see this initiative be taken and given to super-powers like the United States.[2] Instead, for some reason the ones who are often entitled to carry the load, are quite often states who, in the world scale, are relatively small. The ones like Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland are dwarves compared to main powers of the old world, Americas, Asian giants and emerging powers like BRICS countries. While big powers and their relations shape the world order according to who is stronger and often through coercive manners, is it natural that the small powers are the ones who work to maintain the order through soft and peaceful ways? Even if the answer is yes, there are many other small states who never get such chances. This backs up the

[1] reference to known Thycidides observation: “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”

[2] Eriksson J., “Small-State Mediation in International Conflicts”, IB Tauris 2015, introduction

social constructivist, role theoretic approach that puts an emphasis on identity, status and roles that the actors in the society give a meaning to. Constructivist role theory approach serves as a premise to the reasons, because there is no rational or a realist reason why these small states are more successful than others. Therefore the general **research question** is risen: Why small states like Sweden and Norway are successfully asked to act as mediators by conflicting parties? A constructivist approach to identity, role, status, could help to explain the actions employed by big powers and others when asking those states to conduct the negotiations. According to role theory, it would be fair to say that small states like Sweden and Norway are building their reputation and identity as peace facilitators as an end in itself. From there, specific research questions were raised to look answers for: Is the success of Sweden and Norway driven by their status and role? Is the position to be in such role as an end in itself or is it a mean which does serve some more meaningful end within their foreign policy?

The question is **relevant**, because first, it has not been studied specifically from this angle and second, it can prove to be relevant for other small or middle powers who want to acquire a role of a mediator and to contribute to world peace. The research also shows the applicability of social constructivist role theory and public diplomacy to the case as it explains the role-building and image by Sweden and Norway on the international stage as well as the foreign policy decisions by other actors through selection procedure of a mediator.

The aim, object and tasks

The **aim of the research** is to find answers to the puzzle why and how Sweden and Norway have been so successful getting the role of a mediator in international conflicts. The relevant approach in the context of the research appear to be theories of public diplomacy and role theory as a branch of social constructivism. The **statement to be defended** is that socially constructed identity, role, status and image are the main influencing factors which influence other actors' to turn to Sweden and Norway to be involved in the conflicts. Therefore in the process it is also an aim to explain the cases through the prism of these theories. This involves exploration of Sweden's and Norway's status and role in international scene. Public diplomacy and role theory application is carried through to see how Sweden and Norway are building their status and role as mediators in the international scene and their selection therefore can be seen through these perspectives.

To find answers to the research question, it is needed to look at the selection and mandate giving process of a mediator. Therefore, the **object of the research** is the selection procedure of a mediator in mediation activities carried through by Sweden and Norway.

In order to achieve the research aim, **following tasks** should be resolved:

1. introduce the theories of social constructivism, role theory, and public diplomacy, as these three perceptions of international relations are closely interrelated in the context of current research;
2. explore mediation as a conflict resolution method and its uniqueness to understand the tasks that mediators face and which kind of capabilities and instruments are needed for those who take on the difficult work;
3. analyse previous scientific works on the success of Sweden and Norway as mediators;
4. study specific cases of conflicts and their selection procedure of a mediator.

Methodology and methods

The research type is therefore positive, empirical and explanatory (causal). Explanations point to causes of events, identify general causal effects, and reveal the causal mechanisms that produce them. The theoretical approach is based on constructivism and its branch of role theory. The research model is a case study and the goal is to apply the theory to the cases of Sweden's and Norway's role and status as international peace facilitators. Qualitative research strategies were considered useful because they allow explaining "why" and "how" rather than "what" is happening. The specific methods to be chosen were limited to the methods available for a qualitative research, gathering non-numerical data, performing qualitative content analysis of scientific literature, articles, speeches, biographical researches. In addition to qualitative methods, a theoretical methods of analysing will be added. More specifically the description method is used to present key facts of the topic, research object and phenomena and process of mediation. Abstraction method allows for theoretical thinking and logic accumulated from the gathered data to provide reasonable scientific explanation of the reality.

Research source base

Main sources for the research are thematic literature, scientific researches, articles, primary sources like official mediation reports, speeches, reports and official data of the Sweden and Norway Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations peacebuilding commission reports and biographies. These are used in order to capture data having relevance for the study. Latest scientific articles and literature on small state status seeking and small state mediation in international conflicts. To conceptualize and open the theories, the works of the prominent theoreticians of international relations, especially A. Wendt, K. Holsti, S. Harnisch, J. Nye and others are cited and analyzed. Scientific articles are gathered mainly from internet databases like Taylor & Francis Online, SAGE Journals Online and JSTOR research platform. While most theoretical sources are mostly available

in physical form at libraries, there were fewer examples on role-theory and public diplomacy, which had to be collected through e-commerce. Primary and secondary sources for case-studies were dominantly available online, while relevant details were gathered also from paper published materials.

Structure of the paper

The structure of the paper is developed from the tasks needed to fulfil the aim of the research. The first chapter deals with opening the theory of social constructivism, its branch role theory and concepts of public diplomacy. The main theoretical base and conceptualization is needed in order to open the main definitions, to see how the objects of the research group together and to explain the main arguments. The second chapter explores the mediation as a discipline, its history, theory and practice and its uniqueness among the many methods of conflict resolution. Before a mediator is selected, the intermediary between the negotiators must possess certain capacities. Therefore mediation and capacities needed for this role are explored. The third chapter is dedicated to specific cases. It starts with the methodology for the case study, data gathering and continues with exploring status and image of Sweden and Norway. The research will end with an empirical analyze of the samples of mediation cases.

1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

Current chapter will provide a theoretical framework for the research, introducing social constructivism, its branch of role-theory and public diplomacy. These three are closely interrelated in the context of the research. Socially constructed identity, status and role are relevant for current study, because the states under scrutiny have developed a special identity, filling a role that is explainable through those perceptions and concepts. The concepts of public diplomacy introduce the importance of image in the international stage and therefore it could be considered as the other side of the same coin. It is an aim to defend a statement that these factors of identity, status, role and image have had the main impact on their relations to other states, affecting their own and other actors' foreign policy decisions. The starting point of the research is preferred to be social constructivism, because it proved to be essential for the development of role theory. The two theories will be explored in the first subchapter where the emphasis will be given to the relevance of identity, role and status and the process of their formation. The chapter will introduce what is identity, how it is formed, what are status and role. For the importance of image, the second subchapter is dedicated to public diplomacy and its impact on states' foreign policy decisions.

The main authors whose work on theories, on which the research is based on, are the founder of the social constructivism theory, Alexander Wendt and Kalevi Holsti as important thinker for the first concepts of the role theory. For the latter, important input is taken also from the works of Lisbeth Aggestam and Sebastian Harnisch. Public diplomacy is explained with the help of Joseph Nye, as the founder of concept 'soft power' and the emphasizer for the importance image. Also the works of other authors are used whose contribution to the theoretical framework is known to a lesser extent, but is nevertheless important to answer the research question and to defend the statement.

1.1 Social constructivism and role theory: ideas, identity, and role

The social constructivist theory offers its set of ideas and concepts how the world functions. Increasingly more international relations scientific research studies explain a state's foreign policy and international processes based on social constructivism. Social constructivism serves ground for the analysis of the importance of identity in modern politics. Constructivists claim that it is possible for states to reinvent their collective identity and consciously transform their international roles and subsequently change the world order. Constructivists hold that individuals and societies construct each other. Idealist social constructivist approach sees that the society is constructed through inter-subjectivity. The international system is not something out there like the solar system as Wendt has famously put it. It does not exist on its own. Exists only as an intersubjective awareness among people, in that sense the system is constructed by ideas, not material forces. Identity is relatively stable and

with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality it is always an identity within specific socially constructed world. Identities are basis of interests while institutions are nothing but beliefs.[3]

Constructivism deals with the importance of culture, norms, and social processes and practices by which people and groups construct their self-perception.[4] Therefore, one of the dominant concepts in the works of constructivists is identity. In the analysis of international relations, scientists single out the importance of foreign policy as the determining factor of identity. To what extent and how could identity explain the actions employed by states? From a constructivist view, the behaviour of states is driven by norms, social practices and the state identity.

A constructivist approach to cases of international scene would move away from emphasis of states or threats. It would instead explore how identities, actions and human sufferings are constructed through a process of interaction. The problem is therefore, how actors engage with each other, how they define themselves and also others and how this would shape the boundaries of the world where they act. While realists would highlight the competitive nature of states in a condition of anarchy, a constructivist shifts the emphasis to how in a particular context actors came to define their relationship in antagonistic terms. In this context, it is important to notice, what do states consider while driving for the role of peaceful nation and being mediators? Is it an end in itself or is it a mean and purpose for bigger aims? Norway's and Sweden's active engagement in peace processes provides evidence that small states may gain new room of maneuver in their foreign policy - this means that they are not just minor versions of great powers but may actually pursue different goals and policies. In other words, Sweden's and Norway's own activities could be well explained by realists, as peacemaking being a mean for their own survival. At the same time, the decision by other actors to turn to a specific mediator, is much better explained by theories of social constructivism, role theory and public diplomacy. Building an image, identity, filling roles, transforming relationships are essential concepts in this relation and therefore excellent for applicability to current research.

Therefore, constructivists see more potential for transforming relationships.[5] Questions of identity regard how the relationship between self and other is given meaning and how this shapes interactions between them. While, according to Wendt, identity is always relational and established in relation to a series of differences that are socially recognized, the degree of differences can vary.[6] As it will be argued in the empirical part, in case of Sweden and Norway, their identity had been

[3] Wendt A., "Social Theory of International Politics", Cambridge Un. Press 2014

[4] McSweeney B., "Security, Identity and Interests", Cambridge Un. Press, 1999, p6

[5] Fierke K. M. "Constructivism" in "International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity" by Dunne T., Kurki M., and Smith S., Oxford Un. Press 2013, p199

[6] ibid,

mutually constituted around their image of neutrality. Not only identities but the meaning of their actions have grown out of this image. In October 1912, when the Balkan war broke out and was threatening to drag other nations into the war, Swedish government, accordingly declared itself neutral in the same month.[7] A constructivist would raise a question how, given the existence of many small powers in the world, some have come to be elevated above others to become having such status and roles. According to Ann Kelleher, Norway's role in the Sudan conflict mediation illustrates the constructive role a small power can play in conflict resolution and peace-building, not in spite of its lack of power as traditionally defined, but because of it.[8]

There are several ways to acquire identity - some scholars have stated that identities are given and there is nothing that the actor itself can do about it. Others do say that identities are formed and learned over time during different processes - e.g. activities of an actor or others around it.[9] According to Wendt, there are two ways of identity formation - through natural or cultural selection. Natural selection would be more applicable during war time, while cultural selection would be an evolutionary process that also involves social learning.[10] Wendt also explains two other important aspects which shape the formation of identity - characteristic rationalist and interactionist.[11] According to the first assumption the identity is fully formed and further interactions sustain it, while the second, being more complex, sees that with interactions actors learn, adopt and change their identity. These assumptions by Wendt form an essential elements to explain how states activities shape relations between states and form their identities. Identities and interests of states are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant others.[12] While Norway and Sweden have consistently acted in manners of neutral states and at the same time in roles of active mediators, this image has been learned and fixed over time in the perception of other states. Some scholars, at the same time, see in the identity forming the presence and importance of "other states" differently. According to one view, without others identity cannot form, while others claim that presence of others does not influence identity process.[13] Wendt sees the behaviour of states as crucial in how they affect each other and what the developments are. In case of Norway's and Sweden's image as mediators, the

[7] Enzell M., "Requiem for Constitution", diss. in Stockholm Un., Department of Political Science, 2002, p150, a decision that at the time, though, provoked a constitutional crises, because apparently the king not government would have had such right to go to war, defend the country or declare neutrality

[8] Kelleher A., "A Small State's Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making: Norway's Role in Achieving Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement", in journal Civil Wars 2006 vol 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240601060686

[9] Fierke, in Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 2013

[10] Wendt A., 2014, p324

[11] ibid, p333

[12] ibid, p326-327

[13] Fierke, 2014

presence of others has an important significance. Their identity form with interaction with others, through cases of being involved in mediation processes. It is interesting that while Wendt sees the importance of the international environment in forming state identities, Jackson and Sørensen emphasize domestic environment.[14] In current research cases both approaches appear to be important. As domestic environment is derived by the perception of the society, McSweeney states that society's survival is a matter of their identity.[15] McSweeney's idea is that a society has an identity and their survival depends on it. To rephrase the theory slightly differently: a need for survival has also an effect to the society's identity and therefore the identity is formed in a manner that would maintain the survival. In case of Sweden and Norway, according to this logic, the positive effects on survival while being neutral, offering ways to promote peace, maintain the rule-based world order, could have paved a way for the society to support acting even more in this manner. According to McSweeney, it is difficult to choose identity, but it is possible to create it with own actions and decisions that are followed through.[16] It is shown in the research that Sweden and Norway, in a way exactly chose its identity. After seeing their initial success as contributors to peace, there was a strategic decision to follow that path and the actions followed through. Gradually, following the decision, through actions the identity was fixed. Skanland also sees the Norway peace builder´s discourse as intentionally constructed.[17] Skanland´s theoretical approach is that discourses construct truth, meaning and knowledge, and provide lenses through which we perceive the world and the basis on which we think and act. Discourses define what practices are possible, logical and legitimate, rendering others unthinkable or illegitimate. They are constitutive of social reality and establish fundamental preconditions for the adoption and execution of policies.[18] The changes in discourse take generally a lot of time while others are able to recognize and follow them, adapting to new realities. In course of history, there have been of course cases where such changes of interests and identities are far more fast and drastic (e.g. the change in self-image of Germans after the World War II).

Constructivism includes a critique to materialism, it emphasizes social construction of interests, relationships between structures and agents and its multiple logics of anarchy.[19] It emphasizes the social and relational construction of what states are and what they want. The

[14] Jackson H. R., Sørensen G., "Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches", 3rd ed, Oxford Un Press, 2007, p165
[15] McSweeney B., 1999, p70
[16] ibid, p77
[17] Skånland H. Ø., "'Norway is a peace nation': A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement", in journal Cooperation and Conflict, 45 (I), 2010, SAGE Pub. DOI: 10.1177/0010836709347212, p34-54
[18] ibid,
[19] Hurd I., "Constructivism" in "The Oxford Handbook ok International Relations", Oxford Un Press 2010, p298

fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them. In a socially constructed world, the existence of patterns, cause-and-effect relationships, and even states themselves depends of webs of meaning and practices that constitute them. These meanings and practices can be relatively stable, but they are never fixed.[20] This has an emphasis to social not material world, which is the main approach to world by neorealism and neoliberalism.[21] As Mearsheimer argues, the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. Also Neoliberalists like Goldstein and Keohane identify states' material interests as distinct from people's ideas about the world. According to constructivist point of view the ideas that shape international politics are more than just the beliefs of individuals. A social constructivist would summarize the understanding, the ideas are not only embedded in human brains, and they appear also in collective memories, government procedures, educational systems and the rhetoric of statecraft. Therefore, materialist forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life.[22]

As it was brought out already, states' interests are products of their identities. Their foreign policy ideas are shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events. At the same time their interests and identities might be influenced by their interactions with others and with their social environment. This includes processes of socialization and internalization, the drive for social recognition and prestige. The changes in the international relations theories started with the end of "bipolar breeze" as Neumann and Carvalho have referred.[23] Social constructivism, having a focus on international norms, ideas and identity, again opened the field for small-state studies. The relative power and ideational factors matter for small states gaining room for their foreign policy´s manoeuvres.[24] Constructivists address important substantive and relative aspects of international relations, "how to states come to see others as friends or as enemies?" It plays an important part, as Wendt's famous observation asked why 500 British nuclear weapons are seen less threatening to the US than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons. That means states on the international scene can be perceived in one or other role and this has a substantial effect to the relationships between different states evolve and how they act towards each other.

It is commonly understood that the international political system is absent of universal sovereign or worldwide government, thus the states are in a system of anarchy. According to realist

[20] ibid, p300
[21] ibid,
[22] ibid,
[23] Neumann, Carvalho, "Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing" by Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B Neumann, 2014, Amazon Kindle edition
[24] ibid, p9

point of view this is the permissive cause of international conflict[25] - "Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves". For understanding anarchy in international scene, constructivists show that the commonly known model drawn by realists, lacks a socially constructed assumption, that anarchy would assume states' hostility, rivalry against each other and a zero-sum mentality. In another époque, in a different socially constructed paradigm, cooperation as idea may prevail instead. Ideas define values, norms and beliefs that governments hold and for which they pursue and apply power. Ideas define or construct the identities of actors, and these identities in turn interpret or give meaning to the material capabilities and institutional interactions of actors. Interests are not defined just by anarchy or geopolitical circumstances (realist) or institutional interactions (liberal). They are also defined by independent and collective identities. Realists and liberalists do not spend time on how identities of states come about or whether they develop friendly or adversarial self-images of one another. Identity perspectives focus on how actors acquire identities, which shape interests, interactions, and institutions and change material circumstances. Identities cause and give meaning to institutional and material realities. Interests are defined by beliefs not by relative power. Identities are collective, shared, not autonomous, and can be constructed only through repetitive social interactions. It emerges from communicative action, social discourse and shared knowledge that actors develop. In this process they shape shared identities that define them and their counterparts.[26]

Here we arrive to the aspect of status which Wendt himself did not elaborate as much as others. Wendt did concentrate in a factor of role in international politics. Wendt argues that 'role-taking' involves choosing from among the available representations of the 'self' who one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue, in an interaction. In most real life situations role-taking is significantly constrained by existing shared understandings.[27] Constructivists generally agree that states perceive needs and interests and they act in order to satisfy them, it also shows how those interests evolve in the first place and that there is a possibility that different constructions of states could lead to radically different types of states and patterns of state behaviour. The latter is motivated and can be studied only through lenses acquired in social interaction.[28]

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[25] Lobell E. S, Ripsman M. N., Taliaferro W. J., "Neoclassical Reailism, the State, and Foreign Policy", Cambridge Un. Press 2009, p4

[26] Nau H. R., "Perspectives on International Relations; Power, Institutions, and Ideas", 4th ed, SAGE Publ., 2015, p61

[27] Wendt, p329 (2014)

[28] Hurd, 2010, p310-311

Role theory emerged as an approach to the study of foreign policy with the work of Holsti. He argued that decision makers' conceptions of their state's and other states' role on the world stage influenced that state's foreign policy behaviour.[29] As foreign policy analysis seeks to understand the foreign policies of states, the role theory offers an attractive framework especially for smaller states. Holsti noticed that so far small states are analysed primarily as objects of rivalry between the great powers.[30] According to realist point of view the international order is built according to the interests of big powers. There is anarchy that has been sustained by balance of power. Powerful take what they want, the weak accept what they have to. Liberalists would add multilateral agreements and institutional order to the mix. In this system smaller powers do what they can in order to maintain themselves and make the order sustainable. But Holsti found that representing the world in only as of blocs and neutrals is a rough categorization of reality and would not reveal all the behavioural variations observable in the different sets of relationships into which states enter. Same way as designating persons as judge, professor, or politician would not indicate all the tasks individuals fulfil. According to the theory, there are more national role types in the contemporary system and it is possible to construct a classification of national roles that is richer in actual diplomatic behaviour. In addition, using an approach based on perceptions, policymakers do see the roles their nations play in international affairs. Therefore, the theory's focus is on decision makers' conceptions of their and other states' role in international politics and it enables to make sense of the foreign policies of an array of states in the global arena. According to role theory regular behavioural patterns appear for classes of states. Role theorists see the existence of number of social roles - leader, mediator, initiator, etc.[31]

When Alexander Wendt presented his critical theory of international relations, it was based on similar assumptions, while concentrating more to the aspects of constructed reality, ideas and perceived status built from those ideas. Role-theory has rediscovered and further developed by others, for example Walker in 1980s or Aggestam in late 1990s. More recently Harnisch, Maull and Frank have concluded a more comprehensive approach on the theory, combining ideas from Holsti and Wendt to works from recent authors. For current research the theoretical these authors was found the most suitable. According to their concepts, states see themselves in specific light or role while others might see them in similar way or instead in a different light. States work to strengthen their self-image

[29] Holsti K. J., "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" in journal International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 1970, available at JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.vdu.lt/stable/pdf/3013584.pdf
[30] ibid, p234
[31] Harnisch S., Frank C., Maull H. W., "Role Theory in International Relations", Routledge 2011, p7

to be seen in same ways from outside actors of the scene. International context, perception by others and an actor's actions have implications to its role and once again implications to the context. All these are in permanent interaction, defining and constantly able to change also the roles of each actor (see figure 1.)[32] In the context of current study, Norway and Sweden fit well into the theory, while considering themselves neutral, peace-loving states, project this self-image as much as possible also to outside. Their status and role perception is well played out the way Norway and Sweden see themselves and want to be seen. Small states goal would be not so much to change world order through their identity but to maintain it according to the rule-based system - that is to change the world to be more stable.



Figure 1. Role theory model by Prof Dr. Sebastian Harnisch[33]

Roles are social positions that are constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group. Role conceptions for states may vary considerably. On one side there is an ego expectation of appropriate role and on the outside there are alter expectations, by others.

[32] similar model was used also by Lisbeth Aggestam, explaining the roles of the EU member states and others
[33] ibid,

Role conceptions refer to actors' position vis-a-vis to others and the perception of role expectations by others. Role conceptions encompass what Wendt calls social identity.

Already in 1950´s, Anette Baker Fox argued against common perception of small states being helpless pawns in a big game of mighty powers. Studying the influence of the small powers, she showed how they actually have been able to not only survive but to thrive through their foreign policies. While not particularly true in some cases, like the Baltics, she explored the success of Sweden, Norway and Finland during the world wars of the 20th century. While the latter survived through its resilience, the former two depended on their neutral role of international politics.[34] Welch, Paul and Wohlfort see that not only small states but also middle and regional powers and large, emerging powers seek status.[35]

The concepts of social constructivism and role theory, ideas, identity and role are therefore seen fitting well in the context of current study. While some examples of applicability were already given, the main empirical part of the research will is based on the given perceptions. Important factor is considered to be also 'image' and 'status'. These concepts are also related to 'ideas' and 'identities' based, and therefore can be seen as another level of the same theoretical approach.

1.2 Public diplomacy: the importance of image

Public diplomacy is another level of the main concepts described above, as it closely related to role, status and identity. The main concept and importance in public diplomacy is given to 'image'. It goes back as far as an analogy to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conception of the social person, whose motivations for actions, and identity, are rooted in a concern with other people's judgements. Also states as international actors acquire image and may get advantages or disadvantages from it. As the image can affect other actors' decisions, public diplomacy also mentioned often in the same context with the theory of soft power. The founder of the main concepts of soft power, Joseph S Nye, explains how political leaders have long understood the power of that comes from attraction.[36] According to Nye, states that lack military power and economic weight, can still enjoy political influence, because they have defined their national interest to include attractive causes like economic aid or peace making.[37]

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[34] Fox A. B. "The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II", Un. of Chicago Press 1959, available at https://archive.org/details/powerofsmallstat001511mbp

[35] Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlfort W.C., "Status in World Politics", Cambridge Un. Press 2014, p6

[36] Nye S. J., "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics", Public Affairs 2004, p6

[37] ibid, p9

'Power' is understood by Robert Dahl's classic formulation, as A's ability to get B to do something it would not have otherwise done. States with larger and richer economies and stronger militaries tend to have higher status and power. Scholars have recognized though, that many non-material inputs like organizational competence, leadership, legitimacy, etc. play a role in determining a state's status and power. As Wohlfort and others claim, this kind of status can be a source of a power. Other states can accept wishes of another actor out of respect and esteem.[38] Status differs from power in its broader bases. Interpersonal status may be based on expertise, skill, knowledge, or social networks. Therefore for states, diplomatic agility, promotion of new international norms, or moral leadership can be sources of status.[39] Wohlfort and others particularly mention Norway who is widely viewed as having status as an international diplomatic intermediary and peacemaker, but has low military power and capabilities.[40]

As Alan K. Henrikson brings out though, it would be conceptual mistake to assimilate publicly conducted diplomacy only to soft power. The diplomacy is expected to have a public appeal and to win a favour of populations and states it is addressed for.[41] In other words, it might not be used only as a power to make B do what A wants. This is especially true for Sweden and Norway whose foreign policy aims to be specific and internally motivated for benefits at home and at the same time general, abstract and externally intended for benefits to the world.[42] Therefore, in relation to the research, in case of Sweden and Norway, public diplomacy is building an image at home and abroad. It means filling a role the nation feels they are entitled to, and to construct a public appeal to shape the preferences of others and to attract. The states can acquire authority and prestige which would be a source of their own or other countries' foreign policy decisions. Authority is a legitimate right to command over other states. It partly overlaps with status and power but is still distinct from both. Under the same concepts of role theory, social constructivism and public diplomacy 'prestige' is acquired by being superior on an evaluative dimension.

Status and reputation is understood as a state's position in a deference hierarchy or as being related to a state's ranking in international society. It is therefore considered an attribute or a social role that refers to a position vis-a-vis a peer group of states that a given state is assumed to compare

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[38] Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlfort W.C., 2014, p14
[39] ibid,
[40] ibid,
[41] Henrikson K. A., "Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway" in "The New Public Diplomacy - Soft Power in International Relations", Ed. by Jan Melissen, Palgrave Mcmillan 2005, p72, available also at http://culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/pdf/research/books/soft_power/The_New_Public_Diplomacy.pdf, p73
[42] ibid,

itself to and compete with.[43] Wohlfort and others define status as collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued attributes, e.g. wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, diplomatic clout. In international politics, status manifests itself in two distinct but related ways: as membership in a defined club of actors, and as relative standing within this club. Membership in international society is a status sought by others, a state may seek membership in a status group within overall system of states, most notably great-power status. But status can also mean less formalized positional rankings, implying some form of primacy, leadership. It is recognized through voluntary deference by others. Status reflects collective beliefs. States may disagree slightly over the relative ranking of another state, but still there is a general perception about the identity of states and the members of various status clubs. Social status therefore rests on collective judgement, or consensus of opinion. It refers to higher-order beliefs about what others believe. Some attributes that serve as a basis for status are measurable, eg size of the economy, military forces, there are also more intangible assets like cultural achievements, soft power and moral authority, which also play an important part forming the belief about status and role of oneself and by others. Status is described as a "positional good".[44] It cannot be attained unilaterally, it must be recognized by others. Status accommodation occurs when other actors acknowledge a particular state's responsibilities, privileges or rights through various status markers, like summit meetings, states visits, speeches, strategic dialogues, etc.[45] Because status seeking is subjective, such behaviour seeks to influence others' perceptions of a state's relative standing by acquiring status symbols. By status-seeking it is often likely by states to focus on observable qualities and assets rather than less visible goods. Examples can include space programs, high-technology weapons, major diplomatic initiatives, promotion of a state's soft power or culture, efforts to surpass others' economic growth rates. A state who is seeking to improve its status is likely to draw attention to its accomplishments and to make a public claim.

Status seeking can therefore be thought of as acts undertaken to maintain or better one's position compared to relevant others. A quest for status is even more important to small powers than big players. They suffer from status insecurity which makes the status game relevant.[46] Neumann and Carvalho argue that small states seek to be noticed by taking responsible roles in matters of international peace and security. While great powers compete for power and thereby the right to be

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[43] Pedersen B. R., "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-seeking Strategies?" in journal International Peacekeeping, 2018, Vol 25, Issue 2, https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/13533312.2017.1394792, p219

[44] Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlfort W.C, 2014 ref. to Hirsch F., "Social Limits to Growth", Harvard Un. Press 1976

[45] ibid,

[46] Neumann and Cavalho, 2014

the one to reward allies with recognition or security guarantees, small states are instead motivated by the desire to be seen, to share the limelight and to be recognized for their contributions.[47] In this perspective, status-seeking can be seen as competition among small states in different peer groups for recognition by the great powers, where the aim is to improve or consolidate their position just below the great powers. That small states' status-seeking behaviour differs from that of the great powers is supported by the literature, where there exits broad consensus that small states do not try to compete with the great powers for status.[48] Peer-groups with whom the status can be compared, might be regional in nature but can also be more issue-specific, where small states might pursue status within different policy areas such as the environment, human rights, gender equality, and so on, and where their competitors can be more globally situated.[49] The concept of reputation is related to status but differs in a central respect. 'When others hold beliefs about persistent characteristics of an actor, we say that the actor has a reputation for those characteristics or for the behaviours implied by them'. Accordingly, states can have reputations for different strands of behaviour. Reputation and status can be related in two ways. First, reputation is often crucial for changing or consolidating a state's status position. Second, status influences reputation as a source of information and by setting expectations of a state's behaviour. Gaining a desirable status would therefore have an effect on how others perceive the state's past actions and helps to shape expectations to future actions. Although status is often used interchangeably with reputation and prestige, it can be argued that it is more productive to employ them as analytically distinct concepts. Reputation and prestige are somewhat in the control of the actor; actors can seize, acquire and invest in their reputation and prestige. Status, on the other hand, is often regarded as a function of the global or regional system since it is granted or accorded by others, even though it can be influenced by a state's reputation.

What allows small states to increase their status is their relation to the great powers, and it is the great powers' recognition of the small state that gives international leverage in terms of status? In order for status-seeking to be successful, the role played by the small state has to be noticed by the great power, and the recognition needs to be public, which will often take place as an acknowledgment of the small state's large contribution relative to its size.[50]

The welcome that Norwegian peacekeepers have generally received around the world reinforced both countries' self-identification with peacekeeping.[51] Norway's former ambassador in

[47] ibid,
[48] ibid,
[49] ibid,
[50] ibid,
[51] Henrikson K. A., "Niche Diplomacy" 2005, see above

the United States, and former foreign minister and chairman-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Knut Vollebaek, has pointed out an historical explanation, by which Norway was the country in Europe with the highest number of missionaries per capita. Returning missionaries brought home a global, social awareness.[52] This provides consensual ground for the Nobel Peace Prize, which has been awarded in Oslo since 1901. The Swedish industrialist Nobel's gift has enabled Norway to construct a powerful image of peace advocacy, As Henrikson describes, 'niches' in foreign policy are not just given externally, or decided by factors beyond national control - "*They are also deliberate constructs. International roles are written by their authors – political leaders and policy planners – and by those who perform them – a country's officials and diplomats, including public diplomats.*" Therefore, Henrikson asks, whether public diplomacy, while imaginatively conceived and cleverly conducted, actually transforms the environment where a nation's foreign policy is carried out. Answering the question, it is explained that even if there are limits, self-image, a brand idea of a state, can alter the fundamental political circumstances and impacts a climate where governments conduct their affairs.

The limitations of public diplomacy and soft power at explaining attraction at national level, emphasize the need to use also role theory and social constructivism to the research. Latter help better to analyse role and status of small states, not as military, economic neither territorial power, but as moral entrepreneurs. As Neumann brought out, to a small state, status can come not from size but from higher moral involvement.[53] The relative and intangible power introduced by social constructivists, including role theorists, is essential for current research.

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All the concepts brought in this chapter relate to self-image, approve as neutral nations, a constructed role on the international stage and claim that status matters for both, the status seeker and the perceiver. Hierarchies of status recur in world politics, in international system.[54] Hierarchy is systemic, so that it orders relations among all the system's units, despite the absence of central authority. Status brings deference to a state's interest and concerns. The assurance that others would acknowledge, respect state's special interest, not only in crises but also in everyday politics, interactions, is highly valued. High status therefore is possible to confer to tangible benefits in the

[52] ibid, p79
[53] Neumann and Carvalho, 2014, p10
[54] Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlfort W.C, ref. to Watson A., "The Evolution of International Society", Routledge 1992

form of decision making. The higher a status of a state, the more other states adjust their policies to accommodate its interest, institutions and ideas.[55]

If status may be transferred to other, including material attributes, then there would be no need to add to realist analyses of power dynamics.[56] According to Clunan conclusions, status is socially constructed standards of belongings that are normative, not just material, and states are judged as to whether they bear a particular status and can legitimately claim that status and the authority that comes with it. The question of peace and stability in the 21st century may depend on international status politics - the international social construction criteria for status recognition. Having status endows its bearer with certain socially constructed rights and responsibilities and the obligation to enact them. Recognizing state's status gives it the legitimacy to enact that status. Authority and status are socially constructed concepts, as they only exist when people agree that they do.

Traditionalists admit that a state's international status is part of its national interests. Structural realists, though, lack concepts and methods to understand this why states define their interests - including their international status. Knowing which domestic intersubjective national identity a country accepts is critical to understanding status as a national interest. There is a domestic dimension because domestic aspirations for a particular status generate national interest. Foreign policy behaviour therefore is a product of internal and domestic factors.[57] The study of image and statusgives attention to diplomatic processes and outcomes. Both affect multi- and bilateral negotiations. Each state can seek status in a different area, allowing to be acknowledged by others in separate domains. Sometimes states can also combine elements of different strategies in their foreign policies.

How identity, status, role and image transfer to power Sweden and Norway possess in the international stage, will be discovered in the third chapter. Up next, in the middle chapter, it is important to explore the mediation itself as a discipline, including the capacities needed to be a mediator, motivational aspects of each party and how usually the mandate to mediate is given.

[55] ibid, p19
[56] ibid, conclusions by Clunan L. A., “Why Status Matters in World Politics”,
[57] ibid.

2. MEDIATION AND THE CAPACITIES OF A MEDIATOR

The second chapter provides a closer look at what is mediation and what it takes to be a mediator between international conflicts. It includes also motivating factors of mediators and conflicting parties and exploration how the mandate to mediate is usually given. This serves as an important task for the research, to understand the objectives that mediators face and which kind of capabilities and instruments are needed for those who take on the difficult work. Mediation has evolved over time and it is no longer a method to find quick fixes. Long-term approach needs special capabilities from anyone who would serve as a mediator.

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The history has not ended, the world has not entered into forever peace, and international conflicts have not disappeared.[58] Approaching 2020 sees many conflicts around the world, which are in urgent need of resolution. The world is not bipolar as during the Cold War and it is not anymore unipolar like almost two decades of post-Cold War – it is multipolar. Within two decades, China has emerged as a third global superpower. And within a year the US president Trump, with his isolationist and confrontational politics, has disintegrated transatlantic partnership. In a short time it has fluctuated in a way that the US and the EU can be seen powers with distinctly different interests.[59] In this context of four superpowers with different, often conflicting grand strategies and interests, the conflicts are inevitable to rise. In times of retreat of multilateralism, growing isolationism, lack of the global leadership are showing that the power politics is back.[60] Reputable professor of international security dr Sven Biscop has said that even when president Trump is not going to be in power for the second term, this still leaves him three years, in which he can also do considerable damage.[61] The statement was delivered one day before the announcement of recognizing Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, which certainly is a good example of that. The short aftermath has shown not only regional turbulence but

[58] reference to Fukyama essay „End of History?“ (1989) and book „End of History and the Last Man“ (1992), in which he declared the win for liberal principles, achieving forever peace and end of conflicts after the end of the Cold War

[59] e.g. referring to issues of environmental protection, principle of minimum contribution to NATO, Jerusalem recognition, engagement versus isolation, multilateralism vs bilateralism, zero-sum vs positive sum, see also Biscop S., The Great Powers Have Their Ways, Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, December 2017, available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2017/12/SPB93-The-Great-Powers-Have-Their-Ways.pdf?type=pdf

[60] Verbeke J., A World in Flux, Policy Brief, Royal Egmont Institute, November 2017, available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2017/11/SPB92-Verbeke.pdf?type=pdf

[61] A statement by prof dr Sven Biscop during the conference 50th Anniversary of the Harmel Report, in Egmont Palace, Brussels, on December 5th 2017, from author´s notes

global polarization. The World is in a power shift, with not explicitly dangerous, but more so unpredictable and in uncertainty.[62]

Verbeke says that "The big players are testing each other out to see what new power equation may emerge".[63] After the retrenchment of the US, there is no global leadership and no one seems to be interested. In this globally fragile security context it has been seen that the principle of peaceful settlement of conflicts is not holding up to its statement. The decision-makers and policy-forming entities see that after the end of the Cold War, instead of liberal, multilateral development and "end of the history" type of peaceful world, we see a numerous deadly conflicts, terrorism and other violent confrontation related to religion, emerging nationalism, growth of expenses on military, no nuclear proliferation. They also see no global leadership the US has shown for a century after the First World War[64]. As different as the former president Obama and currently Trump are, already Obama was starting to disengage from the global leadership, avoiding conflicts that had no imminent threat to the US itself.[65] What started slowly with Obama, Trump is effectively carrying on and by "America First" policy even not only pushed the brakes but basically turned the vehicle around.

It is possible to reason from this development that something needed and needs to be done to avoid further violence and reaffirm the importance of the principle of peaceful settlement. When conflicts are not settled peacefully and negotiations seem not to be fruitful, it can be deduced that there is a lack of knowledge about how to reach to a settlement with peaceful means. The methods of reaching to resolution, de-escalation of conflict and rebuilding, vary in great detail. In the chapter the method of mediation and its value to reaching to mutually agreed resolution is being explored. As one of such methods is mediation which helps to facilitate negotiations, it was seen necessary to build a system in which such facilitation could be easily available and quickly accessible when needed. While the mediation itself has been used as a conflict resolution method for several decades, the research of the discipline is much younger. And when the leading politicians see themselves in trouble finding the results, it is obvious that this turns their eyes towards research and to such practitioners who know the recent academic developments thoroughly. Peace processes have become complex and certain expertise in thematic process-related know-how would prove to be beneficial. When it seemed there is a lack of this kind of knowledge, it was needed to build such capacity. On the multilateral level the

[62] Verbeke J., p2

[63] Verbeke J., p5

[64] Referring to Wilson fourteen points ending the WWI and putting an effective end to the WWII, containing communism and so-called evil powers even with no imminent threat to the US itself, creating the Bretton Woods system and maintaining it, promoting multilateralism.

[65] e.g. disengaging from war in Syria

UN was one of the first to lead the way creating such structure, with the OSCE and then the EU shortly later following

Charter of the United Nations identifies mediation as an important means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, and it has proven to be an effective instrument to address both inter-State and intra-State conflicts.[66] According to the Charter, mediators have continued to adapt their approaches and capacities to meet the changing nature of conflict, particularly in recognition of intrastate conflicts as a threat to international and regional peace and security. For this purpose, it is important to continue the development of mediation in order to adapt to contemporary conflicts. The growth of the conflict resolution discipline can only be achieved when practice is used to generate new or adapted theory. After formulating such new theories it is possible to give them practical use during a crisis management. Some conflict resolution practitioners believe that theory and practice cannot be separated.[67] Even though, every conflict has its unique aspects, the assumption of conflict analysis and resolution is that there are common theoretical ideas for understanding conflicts and responding to them.[68]

2.1 Concepts of mediation

Mediation is commonly defined as a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them develop mutually acceptable agreements.[69] It is a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. Primary elements of mediation are therefore:

1) a mediator;
2) at least two conflicting parties;
3) a strategy of the mediation;
4) the context of the conflict.[70]

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[66] UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012

[67] Hove M., Ndawana E., „Regional mediation strategy: The case of Zimbabwe", http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124793

[68] Sandole D., Byrne S., Sandole-Staroste I., Senehi J., „Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution", Routlege 2009, p4

[69] UN Guidance for the Effective Mediation

[70] Bercovitch J., " International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings,Routledge 2008

Mediation is voluntary, it has a guidance by a third party and it is aimed at results. It is a vital method in the peaceful settlement of disputes, including intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Ground principles of mediation are inclusivity, coordination, impartiality, consent, preparedness, mutuality, complementary, sustainability, reflexivity, accountability, universality, consistency, national ownership.[71] Third party´s task is to help overcome obstacles and break stalemates, which would help lead toward negotiations and mutual agreement[72]. It can be classified between "pure" and "power" mediation. Pure is a mediation where there is unbiased and non-pressure intervention of a third party and it is a voluntary process, where parties retain control over the outcome. Impartiality means that all the interests of those affected are properly taken into consideration. Opposite is a mediation with muscle, where third-party intervention is combined with positive and negative inducements.[73] Mutuality means that intervener takes care that the intervention is seen to be likely to do more good than harm from the conflict parties' perspective. Complementary means that during the course of the conflict, many mediation and intervention processes can be involved to the solution and all the interventions should complement each other. Sustainability in mediation is related centrally to humanitarian principle, development and conflict resolution intervention, to stay on the course and committed to contribute until the peace has been sustained. Reflexivity asks for the parties to look at themselves, what kind are their motives and aims, what kind of advocacy they pursue.

It is worth to bring out that the research is based on an approved paradigm that intra- and international conflicts and crisis are phenomena which are result of confrontation and polarization, divide individuals, social groups or states, can and often result in violence and violations of human rights, and are hurting the society in short and long-term. This paradigm shows that conflicts need to be resolved.[74] In an opposite paradigm, the conflicts should be left to develop normally without interfering. Scholars and practitioners have recognized that not all forms of conflict should be considered negative, because they can be also constructive, stimulating interparty communication and problem-solving in a collaborative manner.[75] Conceptual approach here is that when the conflict is turning violent, then it is considered already destructive and should be handled with engagement and

[71] See the UN Guidance

[72] Sandole D., Byrne S., „Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution", Routledge 2010, p9; future reference in the research as „Handbook". More approaches how to define mediation by Bercovitch „Mediation and international conflict resolution", in Handbook p340

[73] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p29

[74] See Bercovitch „Mediation and international conflict resolution" in the Handbook, p339

[75] See Pearson F., and Lounsbery M.-O., „The challenge of operationalizing key concepts in conflict resolution theory in international and subnational conflicts", in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p72

resolution. If the prevalent paradigm within international community would be opposite[76], current research and theories promoting intervention would be useless.

Conflict is understood is an overt, coercive interactions of contending collectivities.[77] A state of discord caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests. A disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. The conflict features are that there are two or more parties engaged, there are tensions with or without violence that often lead to crises, there are mutually hostile actions and there is a true or perceived disagreement.

Crisis is a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system.[78] Crisis means that there are significant increases in military activities, decision maker is supposed to act quickly, it may harm interests of the governments and have unexpected occurrences.

Negotiation is a process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts.[79]

The given concepts are the most used during the research, in both remaining chapters. Therefore it was needed to provide the clarification what is meant with each of these in the context of the study.

2.2 Development of mediation

Mediation in principle has a long history but as a scientific object under conflict resolution discipline, it is rather new. Being mentioned in the UN charter, the official practice and scientific development started in 1960s. Since then the approaches have changed in many principles and details. Not often can a third party intervention, including mediation, help protagonists towards sustainable and positive peace. Because of some successes and many failures, the theory has been developed in order to understand the phenomenon and the process in practice. In spite of that, the mediation as a method of conflict resolution, is often failing, not able to cope with new circumstances and different personalities in practice.

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[76] See approach in HSRP (Human Security Report Project). 2006. Human Security Brief 2006. http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSB2006/2006HumanSecurityBrief-Chapter3-HowWarsEnd.pdf, p22

[77] According to VMU lecture material of Contemporary International Crisis

[78] According to Michael Brecher and Wilkenfeld Jonathan "Study of Crisis", University of Michigan Press 2000

[79] According to Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., and Miall H.,"Contemporary Conflict Resolution" 2nd ed., Polity Press 2005, p29

Mediation is only one response to react an appeared conflict. It is a non-coercive, nonviolent, and ultimately, nonbinding' form of peaceful conflict management involving the intervention of a third party into a conflict between two or more parties to help them develop a mutually acceptable agreement.[80] According to Adam Curle[81], the practice of mediation has already a long history which is traceable to Greek and Roman times. In spite of that, the critical studies of mediation started to develop after the WWII when the states agreed by the UN Charter for mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. A principle of peaceful settlements was declared already with creation of Westphalian order but as always, it has been difficult or maybe impossible to realize. In the UN Charter[82], it was mentioned as one tool among an array of pacific settlement of disputes, developed to manage international violence in the context of overlapping local, national, regional and global conflict management regimes. As the peaceful settlement through negotiations and even to start any negotiation was often distracted/limited, the need for mediation, third-party involvement and facilitation grew. Still, even with that acknowledgement, scholars of conflict resolution had agreed that there was a deficit in studies of mediation even in the middle of 1980s. That deficiency has been made up by today, as there are many studies of particular mediations during specific conflicts and also generalized theoretical studies.

By today, comparisons have been made of different types of mediation and different type of mediators whose work has been studied in many variations of conflicts. Mediation can be with or without muscle, mediators can be official and unofficial, from the UN and from governments separately, they can be insider-partial or outsider-neutral. Pure mediation, without muscle, is a non-coercive method, based on problem-solving. Mediation has developed so, that today it is being carried out on different levels, either being Track I or Track II mediation. Track I means dealing with negotiations in front-seat with the leaders and Track II means citizen diplomacy, which include business contacts, churches. As it has been seen, there has to be both official and unofficial diplomatic levels of activities. When first initiatives of mediation were all about Track I, then new initiatives were developed which included also 'back channelling', Track I ½ and Track II mediation. 'Back channel' is a name given to a secret, official negotiations among the parties to a dispute that supplement or replace open existing front channel negotiations. Negotiator in this channel can be a a high-ranked official or also a private individual who has access to the main decision-maker.[83] A 'good

[80] Bercovitch J., "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice" in „Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques" by I. W. Zartman and J. L. Rasmussen, Washington: USIP 2007, p125
[81] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p50-51
[82] Article 33 of the UN Charter (UN 1945), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf
[83] Wanis-St John A., "Back Channel Negotiations", Syracuse Un. Press 2011, p4

offices' is another example of the development of mediation, especially related to back-channelling, as it will be seen later in the case study. 'Good offices' means lighter facilitation of negotiations, acting as a non-coercive intermediary, to provide premises for the sides to negotiate.

A great example about the development of mediation as a technique, would be the resolution of the conflict of Cyprus. The conflict after the WWII, around the time of birth of modern mediation and where different models and techniques, official and unofficial, have been used. As the discipline had a vast development from 1960s then many latest mediation techniques were used in Cyprus throughout the decades to the latest mediation techniques. Starting from John Burton and his Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, proposing to apply their problem-solving method of controlled communication to particular conflict. This, one of the earliest methods had proved to be successful in Malaysia/Indonesia dispute in early 1960s. Cyprus conflicting parties were ready to meet in London in 1966, sending high-level representatives to first share their differing perceptions of the conflict and providing directions towards resolution. This meeting was a perfect lab workshop for the newly founded institution and their developed techniques. Even though further interventions were not allowed for the Burton group, this meeting and the proposed method had a significant impact on later UN mediation techniques.[84] The discipline developed and in Cyprus the methods varied from Burton workshop to Talbot seminar, Kelman and Fisher´s workshops, Broome training, Cyprus Consortium and Fulbright Scholars, and many other methods were used in different levels (see Annex 1 on development of the discipline through the example of Cyprus conflict).

In the post-Cold War era, the nature of international conflict changed in ways that increased the desirability of mediation and have led to increased use of mediation by third parties.[85] This might have been a reason why by the new millennium, the discipline was moving to the next dimension when the UN Department of Foreign Affairs´ DPA Mediation Support Unit was established in 2006 as a central hub for mediation support within the UN system. It provides support to UN good offices activities, including preventive diplomacy and the mediation of disputes.[86] A standby team of eight mediation experts can be deployed within 72 hours, specializing in process design, constitution-making, gender and social inclusion, natural resources, power-sharing and security arrangements. A roster of approximately 300 operational-level, technical-level and senior mediation experts is also

[84] Fisher R., „Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse", in Journal of Peace Research, Sage Publications, 2001 Vol 38, pp307-326, p318, 323, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343301038003003

[85] Bercovitch, J., „Resolving International Conflicts. Boulder, in Greig, J. M., and P. F. Diehl „International Mediation: War and Conflict in the Modern World" Cambridge, Polity 2012, from Google Scholar

[86] See UNDPA Mediation Support Unit http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/mediation_support, and http://www.peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/activities-and-services

maintained as a resource for UN mediators to draw upon.[87] From March 2014 to March 2015, the mediation infrastructure, including the Mediation Standby Team, made over 100 deployments to the field.[88]

Quite often there is an immediate result of light prevention, holding off violence and bringing parties together for a brief time. Having true results, including reaching sustainable peace, on the other hand, is a different matter and has been achieved more rarely in the cases where mediation has been involved. Any kind of conflict resolution method, including mediation, is not effective nor efficient, when the peace is only temporary and no long-term results have been achieved. Therefore the problem to highlight, is that the mediation as a method should be more effective than it has been. In order to contribute to changing this to the better, the aim is to find how the mediation as a phenomena and process should develop in order to be more effective in long-term. Mediation is moving and mediators should shift their focus

1) from light prevention towards deep prevention,
2) from top level assistance of peacemakers to contributing to long-term peacebuilding,
3) from immediate crisis resolution to sustainable conflict resolution.

The prediction therefore is in favor of mediator being not only facilitator of smooth negotiations but also being consultant to the parties which way to facilitate multi-level integration and peacebuilding. This would function as achieving the mediation being more fruitful and the results being more lasting. This assumption will be closely surveyd in the third chapter, how Sweden and Norway have developed their capacities, techniques and strategies as mediators, and whether this has served for their role-building and image.

2.3 Mediation mandate and exceptionality

OSCE recent reference guide states that *today, mediation is widely recognized as one of the most effective means for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts both in terms of costs and results. Faced with the emergence of new conflicts and the persistence of protracted conflicts, international and regional organizations resolved to strengthen their capabilities for effective mediation and dialogue facilitation. In this context, it has been recognized that both mediation and dialogue facilitation need to be approached as a professional activity requiring specialized*

[87] According to UN document http://www.peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/stand-by-team

[88] UN factshee,t https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Factsheet%202018%20Standby%20Team%20-%20English_0.pdf

knowledge, expertise, and operational guidance, as well as sustained political, financial and administrative support.[89]

Inclusive mediation is a problem-solving interactive intervention process with a third party who attempts to empower both parties to reach consensus.[90] Well postulated is Adam Curle´s description: What mediators do, is to establish or re-establish sufficiently good communications between conflicting parties so that they can talk sensibly to each other without being blinded by such emotions as anger, fear and suspicion.[91] This might not immediately mean a definite solution but it is start for going towards it. According to theory, mediation can be used in every stage of the crisis after the on-set. When the polarization occurs, it is essential that there is at least two sides, which means that there is already a chance for (mis)communication between sides, which can be guided with or without the help of a third party. This logic would apply during the whole conflict until to the moment when there is no active confrontation anymore. This could mean either there is an agreement which is mutually accepted, or there is such transformation that the issue seems irrelevant or transformation of actors so that they are not representing polarized sides. No more confrontation could also mean an unfortunate outcome of violence or natural cause, where there is only one actor remaining.



Figure 2. Conflict escalation and de-escalation.[92]

[89] OSCE Reference Guide for Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation 2015, available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/126646?download=true, p7

[90] Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p10

[91] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H, 2015, p259

[92] Handbook on Conflict Resolution, p11

It is most common that mediation takes place in the top phases of a crisis - between violence ceasefire (see figure 2) and it is often an input for ceasefire and other agreements that reduce immediate violence. Mediation is commonly accepted because it has (at least should have) an unbiased party, who acts both subjectively and objectively as a balancer between confronting actors. Cooling down emotions or setting the mood are something that can be organized by some mediator and not by others but the third party presence has an objective effect which helps not to let things out of hand. As the stages of the crisis differ by nature, it has been argued that there are also different types of third-party interventions which are more effective in particular stages of the process. It seems that optimal would be to use softer forms of intervention when the miscommunication and mistrust between parties is high and harder forms when substantive interests prevail.[93]

Different motives can lead to mediation as negotiations facilitation. The process is certainly time-consuming and even with the best intentions, there is high risk that the efforts will not be rewarded.[94] Three motivations tend to be dominative leading to mediation.[95] First is that the cost of continuing the conflict is too high. Costs could be monetary or humanitarian, but at some point parties see that it is better to end the conflict than carry it on. Second reason is their inability to handle the conflict on their own. Finally, both parties need a third party that they can trust. Conflicting parties may have a difficult time trusting one another, and if there is a desire to end the conflict, a trustworthy third party in between the primary parties can be more effective. The trust part serves as an important factor in relation to current study. In the empirical part, it is to be seen how much trust as a condition influenced the selection of either state to be approved as a mediator.

Mediator can be an unofficial individual or also official representative. Individual might be personally invited, official mediator means that he or she has a mandate from international organization. In both cases the mediator can be motivated by changing the course of crisis, by channels of communication, wanting to spread or put into practice a set of ideas. Even though in principle, the mediator is impartial, the representatives own political interests might be motivators too. To preserve or change a structure or influence the situation towards politically favourable way. This does not have to mean being biased, it can also mean finding unbiased solution and fair interest of keeping the stability in the area, because instability would negatively affect the mediators' territories or society.

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[93] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H, 2015, p51

[94] Bercovitch J., „Mediation and international conflict resolution", in Handbook, p343

[95] Brouwer G., "The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation", review article of the book by Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen, in Arbitration Law Reviw, Vol 3, Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, article available at https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1189&context=arbitrationlawreview,

The relevance of impartiality has been studied, whether it is a necessary for mediation to be successful. It is a dominant view but there are many studies which show that it does not affect the success of a mediation.[96] Impartiality does not mean that the mediator has no interest in finding a solution. Bjerfeld agrees though, that even with arguments favouring the partiality, then in the stage of choosing a mediator, impartiality plays an important factor. He found that partiality has a negative effect on the state's future possibilities to being asked to serve as a mediator. It is likely that both or all the parties would prefer an impartial middle-man. When all other measures are equal, an impartial actor tends to receive more offers to mediate than a partial actor.

Another motivator, not especially good one, might be personal fame or fulfilment. Even though, mediators are often constrained by the need for confidentiality, nor do they make money, write articles or give interviews.[97] As Curle puts it, the main reason for mediator to submit to such considerable trouble and inconvenience would actually be contribution to possible reduction of human misery.[98]

In international conflicts, mediations are usually initiated through mandates that may come from different sources. The mandate source is crucial to the success of the mission.[99] Parties to a conflict may not prefer to give a mandate at all by being sceptical to intervention, not certain of the motivation and hidden agendas of the mediator. If the mandate is given by respected organization, conflict parties tend to be more accepting of facilitation. Mandate guides the mediator in the mission. It would provide the authority and a general approach how to carry out the mediation. It could come from international organizations or be provided by the parties themselves. External mandates are public in nature, while internal mandates can be much more secretive. Parties requesting mediation by themselves generally want to keep the proceeding under wraps and avoid a perception of weakness.[100]

No mediator end up by chance into a conflict. Every mediation has its history. Svensson sees that historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars.[101] The likelihood of accepting a third-party intervention is bigger in intra-state conflicts and lower in cases of civil wars.[102]

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[96] Bjerfeld U., "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics 1945-90", in the Journal of Peace Research, vol 31, no. 1, 1995, pp22-35, available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343395032001003

[97] See Curle A.in Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p260

[98] ibid,

[99] Brouwer G., article in Arbitration Law Reviw, Vol 3, see above, p470

[100] ibid, p471

[101] Melin M., Svensson I., "Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars" in journal International Interactions, vol 35, issue 3, 2009, p249 https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/03050620903084521

[102] ibid, p251

When the conflicting parties or international organization set the mandate it becomes a base for the examination of the whole process. According to Lehti the mandate is usually given through an informal process and formal invitation follows later.[103] In this case the work of the mediator is confidential and only when certain results are achieved, it will be announced. However, different to arbitration, the parties retain a veto and thus the position of the mediator is weaker. The external actor mandating the mediator could be a major power, an international or regional organization, or some other body or group to which the country in question formally belongs or whose authority it has to respect. Even though the parties have to accept mediation process, they can remain unhappy with the objective or the mediator and strive to ruin the process in different ways.

For the conflicting parties mediators are chosen for reasons as perceived impartiality, an established reputation, etc. – and thus, this perception becomes part of the peace process. The motive might not be only to end the conflict but parties could want also to legitimate their status, avoid concessions by prolonging the process, pursuit gaining strength and advantage.[104] Melin and Svensson studied the incentives for mediation and discovered that the conflicting parties tend to accept mediation easier in interstate than intrastate civil conflicts. In latter mediation will be accepted in the most 'difficult' circumstances.[105]

Another side of the coin is who is willing to be in a position of a mediator. In order to acquire the position of a mediator, both preconditions must be met - a mediator has to be accepted and there must be a willingness to mediate. It depends on a range of factors, such as economic, national, and cultural interest, as well as geographical proximity to the conflict area. Bercovitch and Schneider have similar arguments that mediation offering is dependant of mediation price, proximity, preferences, and power. Crocker suggests that "mediator readiness" consists of three dimensions: operational, strategic and cultural. Operational, relating to the administrative and the leadership resources; strategic, so that the country has the political willingness and backing of the intervention; and cultural, i. e. it has the contact, ties, and previous access to the parties that enable a fruitful relationship-building.[106] These reasonings have to be considered in the context of current research, while looking at the mediation mandate giving procedure to Sweden and Norway. It will be seen that in particular cases the motivation, especially strategic willingness can be related to the constructed image and status and combination of altruism and realpolitik.

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[103] See Lehti p126, https://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/94740/nordic_approaches_to_2014.pdf
[104] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H, 2015, p322
[105] Melin & Svensson, 2009, p250-251
[106] ibid, p255

2.4 Mediation in practice: strategies and techniques

While the post-Cold War era changes in international system also resulted in proliferation of intrastate conflicts and a decrease in the number of interstate conflicts[107], nothing is easier today. Nowadays, in a context of a system with one remaining superpower, but the same time multi-polarity and global interdependence, conflict actors are often non-state and transnational in nature. Fragile or failed states characterized by a lack of a monopoly on the use of force and limited governance capacity, adopting asymmetric strategies have become an international norm and contemporary conflict resolutions, including managing interventions by third parties are increasingly in demand.[108] Conflict management is a complex task in this environment, and it is demanding a range of strategies by third-party states, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations.

It is acknowledged that there is hardly a single theory which approach of mediation will lead to a success. Different types of interventions are effective at different stages of the conflict resolution process and the type chosen should always be dependent on the nature and stage of the conflict. Softer forms of intervention could be more useful when miscommunication and mistrust between the actors is high (strong subjective elements), while harder forms are more successful when substantive interests are in the forefront.[109] Woolford and Ratner distinguish evaluative, facilitative, and transformative types of mediation. In evaluative mediation there is a pragmatic goal to end the disruptive conflict by bringing the disputants to a mutually agreed resolution. Facilitative mediators concentrate on procedural dimensions of justice, they foster creativity and communicative openness among the parties. Facilitative approach sees it important to find common interests which are found by series of moves or influence techniques. Transformative mediation is more aimed at the result and substantive goals which define the content of the mediation in hand. Transformation in mediation means that a fast agreement is secondary, the main aim is to help parties to come to new realization about themselves through open dialogue. It can also be expressed in transforming individual´s character to be morally better, empowering self-esteem, self-efficacy and self-respect, recognition of other party, helping both sides to better understand each position, build empathy. Problem-solving process is headed toward identifying a problem, establishing criteria to evaluate root causes and to select a solution.[110] An ambitious method, where parties are invited to re-conceptualize their conflict

[107] Duffield M., „Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London: Zed Books 2001, from Google Scholar

[108] Wallis, J. "The South Pacific: 'Arc of Instability' or 'Arc of Opportunity'?" in journal Global Change, Peace and Security 27 (1): Feb, 39–53. 2015, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14781158.2015.992010

[109] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p51

[110] Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p11

with a view to find creative win-win outcomes. Both are essentially important and should be used hand-in-hand when possible.

What comes to a strategy, Ramsbotham and others classify those to communication-facilitation strategies, procedural strategies, and directive strategies. The factors that should affect the choice of a strategy are conflict intensity, previous relationship of protagonists, mediator identity, mediation initiation, mediation environment During the practice of mediation, four aspects are essential to which must develop and to which a mediator has to contribute in order to make the third-party intervention successful. These are building, maintaining and improving communications, providing information, befriending, and active mediation.[111] In order to be effective the mediator must be have information, analytical and communication skills, commitment to peace, acute awareness of the political environment to both build the relationship and even getting close to both sides personally.[112] A mediator is not a usual civil servant or a diplomat, he must come with a good will and want to sincerely contribute to help the civilians as those true victims of the conflict[113] and to be concerned about the mental anguish for the decision makers. This kind of sincere contribution would function as „befriender", making the mediator and protagonists close to each other. A mediator has to be involved in providing necessary information, be aware of facts and must be diplomatically active in an attempt to persuade and promote approaches which would help parties toward resolution. The job of an intervener is to remove obstacles on the path to peace and help to clear up misunderstandings and preconceptions what there might be between the protagonists. They work toward changing the conflict from a destructive to cooperative relationship.[114]

As it was brought out, a mediation can either be pure or carried through with power. Pure mediation is a conciliation and facilitation and a process where parties retain control over the outcome and no coercive or muscle power is used. It is an unbiased process encouraging parties to move towards negotiations. In international affairs, pure mediation is typically practiced by esteemed persons, small powers like Sweden and Norway, or international organizations, especially the UN, while power mediation is more likely to be employed by the major powers, such as the USA, China

[111] See Curle A. in Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p261

[112] Kleiboer M., The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynn Rienner Pub. 1998,

[113] The evidence shows that civilian non-combatants die in far greater numbers than military combatants, see Rothbart D., and Korostelina K., „The enemy and the innocent in violent conflicts", in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p86

[114] Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p10, with a reference to Umbreit M., Mediating interpersonal conflicts: A pathway to peace, CPI publishing 1995

or the UK.[115] Mediation for reconciliation includes methods of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided parties.[116]

Marieke Kleiboer brings out four different models a mediator an use:, the power-brokerage model, the political problem-solving model, the domination model, and the restructuring relationship model. According to Kleiboer, each of these models approach the mediation technique in distinctive ways. Political problem-solving model sees conflicts as socially constructed and mediation can handle both prevention and containment of violence. It was argued, for example, that pursuing the pure mediation in aforementioned Cyprus case, was the right choice and power mediation with rewards, sanctions and punishments would not have moved parties toward settlement.[117] Manipulation could be added to communication, but according to authors approach, this would push out one of the main features of mediation, the unbiased third party, and it should no more be called mediation in that case. There is a research, though, which says that common view to the third-party impartiality is questionable because partiality has brought more success than neutrality.[118] This is called insider-partial mediation. According also to Wehr and Lederach, the effectiveness of the mediator does not necessarily depend on externality and neutrality but can depend instead of internality and partiality.[119] This can be the case especially in non-western cultural environment where trust and cultural connectedness are more valued than neutral, detached mediating.[120] Trusting and friendly relationship and cultural connectedness should occur in any mediation, where parties want to reach successful resolution, and this does not necessarily mean leaning to insider-partiality, favouring one or the other side. Therefore, in order to facilitate peace, the mediator can and should still maintain his or her impartiality after building trust and personal closeness to the both sides.

It is another side of the strategy or tactics, when to intervene. As it was brought out, in principle, the mediation process can take place any time when there are two sides, starting from polarization to the last stages of de-escalation. To be more efficient, though, it has been found that the best time to any kind of intervening with would be either in the early stages of conflict or in the late stage, instead, not in the middle of violent conflict. There are two reasons for that. First is that during

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[115] Fisher R., „Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversial Impasse, 2001, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343301038003003 , p313

[116] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, pp29-30

[117] Ibid, p323

[118] Svensson I., "Research on bias in mediation: policy implications", Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, 2:1, 2013; O Elgstrom, J Bercovitch, and C Skau, "Regional organisations and international mediation: the effectiveness of insider mediators", African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 3:1, 2003

[119] Wehr P., Lederach J., "Mediating conflict in Central America", in Journal of Peace Research, 28, 1991, available at SAGE Journals online http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343391028001009

[120] Wehr and Lederach research referred by Pearson F., and Lounsbery M.-O, in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p72

the peak of the violence the tension and stakes may be too high, the energy is located towards managing the forces, confrontation is big, and there are higher hopes for gaining ground with violence. These factors influence counteractively to start any kind of non-coercive mediation process. Second reason is that during the start of the conflict the positions of sides have not yet hardened and during the late stages, the exhaustion has its impact for the parties to realize that victory is not possible for either side through confrontation or the stalemate is not letting the conflict to solve.[121] These acknowledgements in the early and later stages of the conflict will function as facilitators for the parties to accept intervening, including mediation as a help either bringing solution without the confrontation going to violence or helping to get out of the stalemate. It would be possible to move forward to negotiations from both cases. Later on these factors will be considered in the research through specific cases, where Sweden and Norway have detected a specific moment of "ripeness" to intervene and successfully capture the position of a mediator.

What cannot be underestimated is also considering the social identities and cultures of the conflict parties. Whether the protagonists belong to individualistic or collective cultures, might distinguish the strategies which are more efficient. For example, the readiness of an individual to sacrifice his or her own welfare or even life is much higher in collective cultures and therefore this must be considered while choosing appropriate approach of intervention. Social identities also influence the groups´ readiness for conflicts, which can be measured by different early-warning indexes.[122] Therefore noticing such readiness of different social identities is also crucial in hopes of finding positive results of conflicts through mediation.

An insider-partial mediation strategy in the case of Zimbabwe registered some successes but encountered challenges and ultimately failed to deliver a lasting solution to the conflict.[123] The mediation was perceived partial to the ruling president. Therefore as a conclusion, the authors recommend that mediation process in Zimbabwe would be restarted by first appointing an impartial mediator who could act in a manner that helps to build trust with and among all the parties involved in the conflict. Still, looking at given data in the research, it is hard do see the South African intervention as mediator in Zimbabwean conflict, as being insider partial. The authors separate relational partiality, process partiality and outcome partiality. The main connection to partiality of South Africa, is given that SA has proximity to the conflict, it is closely affected by escalation of

[121] See Pearson F., and Lounsbery M.-O, in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p77, with a reference to Zartman W., „The timing of peace initiatives: hurting stalemates and ripe moments", in Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1: 8-18, 2001, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TimingofPeaceInitiatives_Zartman2001.pdf

[122] Korostelina K., „Identity conflicts" in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p100-112

[123] Hove M., Ndawana E., „Regional mediation strategy: The case of Zimbabwe", available at Taylor and Francis online http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124793

Zimbabwean conflict. These criteria, on the other hand, do not show directly neither relational, process nor outcome partiality. The main interest of South Africa is still the peaceful solution of the conflict and avoid future turbulence in the area. Therefore South Africa must have every reason to be very impartial in order to find peace in which both sides would accept in both short and long-term.

At the same time, as Kleiboer puts it, mediation theorists should not seek to develop a single theory but should instead produce contingent, multilevel, systematic description and understanding of dynamics of a particular case.[124] Considering the strategy and techniques one has to be ready to other obstacles there likely will occur. One example would be to consider war-time economies and possible usage of natural resources[125]. Continuing availability of lucrative resources and economic predation can pose challenges to difficult process of conflict resolution including mediation.[126] Facilitating peace agreements in such situation, it is clear that agreement should therefore not only address the structural causes of the conflict, but should also include provisions for wealth-sharing and resource management. These issues should not be treated as secondary but as integral part of successful peacemaking.[127] Economic life continues during armed conflict, it is just adapted. If parties forget, the third party facilitator can remind the importance to build a new economic structure, a framework for private sector and fair commodity trade, which would serve public interests, not the ruling elite.[128]

2.5 Mediation support

In practice, to carry through a mediation, not only a good diplomat, a representative who knows the conflict inside-out is needed. Important part of the process is given to the mediation support units, without whom it would be impossible to guarantee a success. The main tasks of the unit is to provide knowledge of theoretical and practical issues of mediation process, show the representative or his/her team opportunities, dangers and pitfalls of negotiations. It is also to provide technical assistance. Today, every state or organization wishing to have a capacity in mediation, has or must have a unit supporting these efforts.

Mediation support covers activities which would make mediation effective. The UN Secretary-General report describes a wide concept, where mediation support activities include efforts to enable environment for mediation, support ongoing mediation processes (ranging from providing

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[124] Kleiboer M., The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynn Rienner Pub. 1998,

[125] Heiko Nitzschke & Kaysie Studdard (2004) War Economies, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 1:3, 77-80, DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2004.386918665142, p77-80

[126] Ibid, p78, cases Afghanistan, Congo and Liberia

[127] Ibid, p78, Sudan conflict resolution

[128] Ibid, p79

political advice to logistical support), support the implementation of peace agreements, and building a capacity for mediators, conflict parties and societies at large.[129] OSCE defines mediation support as the operational capacity to assist dialogue facilitation and mediation activities.[130] To make a short resume of Stine Lehmann-Larsen study, she describes mediation support as follows operational support, which includes direct support through field deployment, e.g. on-site thematic and process-orientated expertise, day-to-day management of the process and parties, logistic support and flexible resource management. It entails also substantive desk support, like process design, problem-solving workshops, briefings, research and analysis. It contains also activities including confidence building and technical support to the parties.[131]

Mediation support also functions as an institutional capacity building, providing training to establish clear decision-making, planning, coordination procedures, briefings, training curricula design, and access to expert networks and human resources, skills enhancement, including training of mid- and high-level mediators in the field. Mediation support require knowledge management and accumulating and disseminating comparative knowledge or substantive issues on mediation processes. Management and research of knowledge refers to both tailor-made, process-specific research such as conflict briefs and stakeholder analysis, and additional research relevant to the field. Mediation support is also networking and experience-sharing, which enforce positive relationships and allow mediators to share and discuss their experiences.

Lehmann-Larsen in her study concentrates mostly on these main features of mediation support, providing description, examples and challenges. In this study the aim is not to concentrate on these features in detail, but to see the structure of the units. Mediation support unit consists usually of specialized team that can be rapidly deployed on a temporary basis into the field. The members provide technical advice officials and others engaged in preventive diplomacy or mediation. According to the UN factsheet, the tasks of mediation support unit can include providing technical expertise in a specific area, giving advice on procedural and agenda-setting issues, providing analysis of the positions of parties in negotiations, including the identification of potential points of convergence as well as possible gaps, and drafting the text of agreements; leading workshops for parties on substantive or process issues; and providing specialised mediation training and coaching.[132] Mediation support team members are usually experienced in mediation situations and are experts in

[129] See the UN Activities in Support of Mediation, Report of the Secretary General, A72/115, June 2017

[130] OSCE Manual/Guide on mediation and facilitation http://www.osce.org/secretariat/126646?download=true, p10

[131] Lehmann-Larsen S., Effectively supporting mediation: Developments, challenges and requirements

[132] The UN fact sheet 2017 and information about the UN mediation support unit at https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/activities-and-services

a range of issues that arise frequently in peace negotiations, for example the overall design of processes, security arrangements (ceasefires/disarmament, demobilization, reintegration/security sector reform), constitutional processes, gender and inclusion, power-sharing issues, and natural resources. When not deployed, the team is on permanent standby, carrying out research and coordinating reviews of best practices in their area of expertise. The unit is also responsible for producing operational guidance notes and related training materials, and supporting to develop networks of thematic experts.

Giving an example of a state effort towards developing their permanent mediation support structure, Germany and their Federal Foreign Office has reported that mediation support means support for mediators and mediation teams and processes. It aims to sustainably improve the conditions for successful mediation and long-term peace processes by providing targeted support to stakeholders. Its target groups and users include mediating third parties, conflict parties, stakeholder groups and donor institutions, and other supporting actors. Persons and institutions engaged in mediation support can act as mediators, advisers, training providers, researchers, supervisors and coaches.[133]

For another example, more often than not, mediation support team members are part of the political team who are usually the official heads of the delegation. Being in background, the delegation can rely on their expertise to have an effective mediation and not to make any blunders. To conclude, the mediation support unit is a team of members, who support organizations´, states´ mediators, peacemakers, negotiators, in matters that quite often are not related to a specific conflict, but is more so related to techniques making the mediation successful. The support is mostly depoliticized, it helps the decision-makers, political negotiators with issues that is not within their expertise. It is quite common that the main mediator is a well-known former politician, who might be influential in his personality but who does not have specific skills required for making the mediation effective and efficient. For these skills and to avoid a mis-step, the supporting unit by their side is necessary.

2.6 Measuring, evaluating mediation

A significant part of where mediation as a discipline should develop, is in an understanding of contemporary measurement of successful mediation. The views on this issue have been also changing, which affect applying yardsticks to measure success in peace mediation. Questions like “what is the contribution to peace”, “What is a good result in peace mediation”, need to be answered. There are different outcomes of a peace process and they can range between negative and positive peace, or

[133] According to the official report of the Germany´s Federal Foreign Office organized conference Germany as Mediator, 2014, available at http://www.konferenzfriedensmediation2014.de

between effectively stopping or just reducing violence, or between temporary or sustainable cease-fire. Even though the ultimate goal should be sustainable peace, mediators have often appreciated the "negative peace" and the gains which are achieved during the process.[134] The peace process can generate a series of intangibles peace assets – confidence building, more knowledgeable peace negotiators, softer political stances, informal peace alliances and networks, etc. – that may later disappear or remain and generate previously unforeseen peace opportunities.[135] Sometimes the impact of mediation on the relationship between the parties have been important, even when a peace accord is not achieved.[136]

From a study of the fundamentals of conceptualizing peace understood in Norwegian peace facilitation, a three-tier, modular understanding of success has been developed:

(1) Sit down and talk: Success measured in terms of the holding of dialogue between conflict parties;

(2) Negative peace: Success measured in terms of the signing of a peace agreement between the conflict actors;

(3) Positive peace: Success measured in terms of the peaceful transformation of the conditions that made conflict possible.

The dialogue between the parties to the conflict is the first step to transforming an armed conflict. Even before an agreement is within reach, an honest dialogue between opponents will presumably open the way to behavior change. Dialogue creates the conditions for conflict actors to de-demonize each other and exercise caution in approaching the media and making public statements. When the first aim is just to sit and talk, possible quantitative indicators to measure this dimension could the extent of inflammatory speech and hate rhetoric in participants' statements, the frequency of skirmishes and clashes, the number of women participating in the negotiations as delegation members, and the extent of inflammatory speech and hate rhetoric in the media.[137]

Achieving "negative peace", is the next step, assuming that armed actors would probably not participate in dialogue only for the sake of dialogue. While perceptions and opinions may differ during the talks, a dialogue, being honest and facilitated, is aimed at reaching agreements, from modest ceasefires and to comprehensive peace agreements. The terms of the agreement could address the specific causes of the conflict, including manifestations and the grievances involved. At the same

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[134] Fabra-Mata J., „Measuring effectiveness of Norwegian peace facilitation", available at http://noref.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e23454cf4b5b3ce7db3290469510428f.pdf

[135] Ibid,

[136] Ibid, with a reference to Lanz, D., Wählisch M., Kirchhoff L., Siegfried M., "Evaluating Peace Mediation" London: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2008

[137] ibid,

time, it can be expected that the agreement facilitated by a third party will be aligned with international norms and core democratic principles, and will include transitional justice provisions as appropriate. Indicators of a peace agreement that could help to measure achieving negative peace are the mechanisms for the inclusion of civil society at both the grassroots and national levels, the number of concrete proposals from civil society integrated into the peace agreement, the provisions for increased female political participation; and the validation of the peace agreement by the society at large.[138]

In the next stage, hopefully "positive peace" would be achieved. The implementation of a broad-based agreement is a defining moment that will either make peace or break it. Resources for the implementation of the various provisions need to be allocated, while targets need to be set and responsibilities divided up. Generating a social contract, changing attitudes and transforming informal institutions comprise a long-term project requiring the active participation of local stakeholders. Indicators to measure this progress could be the number of concrete civil society proposals integrated into the peace agreement, the perceptions of security and peace in the country; citizens' satisfaction with public services, and the country's Gini coefficient.[139] These criteria help easily measure how well the intervention techniques have worked. Evaluation in the middle of the process is often necessary, because it will help to see, has everything moved according to the hopes and plans or worse or maybe even better. The evaluation can be either formative or summative, where the former is focused more on processual issues and the latter judge the intervention quality and success in meeting its objectives.[140] The ultimate goal of conflict resolution, with or without help of mediation, should be sustainable and inclusive peace. Former Norway minister of foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre referred to his experience saying: "I have learnt that using the term "success" only for when you get parties to sit around a table, signing an agreement is too narrow a definition. What we do, in most cases, is to contribute to a positive development".[141] Therefore in the long-term, mediators should have this big picture in mind while starting with the small steps of "sit down and talks".

Preventing further violence, the different methods can be classified to belong to either light or deep prevention categories. Light prevention practitioners do not concern too much with roots of the conflict but rather aim to prevent it becoming severe armed conflict. Examples of light prevention are diplomatic intervention, long-term missions and private mediation. The aim is to find quick solutions to the matters in hand, for example finding ways to end violence at least temporarily and to provide

[138] ibid,
[139] ibid,
[140] see Gürkainak E., Dayton B., Paffenholz T., „Evaluation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding" in Handbook p287
[141] Fabra-Mata J., reference to Nordviste, "How do other states see Norway as an international peace negotiator? Is there a gap between the Norwegian view and how other states perceive Norway?" Master's dissertation, Un. of Oslo 2012

humanitarian relief as quickly as possible. Trying to solve crisis by short term solutions, is not going to help to solve it though. Temporary negotiations, cease-fire or humanitarian relief will help but it does not go into the roots of the crisis and therefore will not be a lasting solution.

Deep prevention on the other hand aims to address the root causes. Within society it may mean engaging in development, political culture and community relations.[142] On the state level methods like true democratization process, good governance, forming sound institutions, effective development are helpful towards deep/structural prevention[143]. High levels of development reduce the risk of civil war. Risk is higher in the poorest group of countries and violent conflict in turn impoverishes people. Stagnant economies, past conflicts, poor society and ethnic groups, inequality, all raise the possibility of future conflict.[144] For these reasons deep conflict prevention methods are necessary because they would help to reduce the causes of confrontation and polarization which in turn might lead to violence (see Annex 3 for deep prevention methods of intrastate conflicts).

For example, in the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar, which has lasted already for about 70 years, the deep prevention methods have been rarely used. That means, when the main interest of minority group is to be acknowledged, to have of their basic rights, to have denied citizenship, being stateless, [145] then small steps of cease-fires and just sitting down will not help. Just recently, after the free democratic elections and with a hope of new State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi in power, instead of de-escalation, the crisis has escalated and violence between the social groups of Rohingya Muslims and the local Rakhine state majority of ethnic Buddhist has appeared. Current crisis from 2012 has not been resolved and there is a definite polarization between ethnic groups and it has been deepened by state‘s refusal to provide basic human rights to Rohingyas and not taking appropriate securing measures which would prevent violence. The positive examples of deep prevention in Myanmar are that for the last years the country has been heading towards democracy and there is a development with the help of foreign investments. But when the minority is not considered even as citizens, their culture is not respected, almost no basic human rights are guaranteed, one cannot talk about true structural prevention of the conflict. Light prevention on the other hand has been used more often. State level consultations have been organized, ceasefire agreements signed, humanitarian relief offered, international sanctions imposed and resolutions adopted. This shows conflict resolution as very multilevel process where no result is achieved by concentrating on a narrow scope. Therefore,

[142] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p108
[143] ibid, p119
[144] ibid, p120
[145] Holliday I, „Addressing Myanmar’s Citizenship Crisis“, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol 44, 2014 issue 3, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.877957

even with appropriate state level measures, the methods of societal level will be at least as important: to provide regional security arrangements, to follow the rule of law, to protect human rights, to strengthen civic society and institutions, to organize round-tables workshops, to enhance community relations.

In order to achieve sustainable and long-lasting peace, mediation in crisis management practice should be moving to combining both peace and justice.[146] This again shows that, as difficult as it may be[147], mediator should not only concentrate on short-term peacemaking, but also give as much as possible input to next step peacebuilding. Transformation should and would be the essential element of mediation in the future. It is acknowledged that stable peace requires more than just ceasefires and formal cessation of warfare – it requires also reorientation of perceptions so that parties stop seeing each other as threats and enemies.[148] Such transformation would function automatically as facilitation for ceasefires, cessation and peace. It has been noticed that lack of mutual concern was the main reason for example in Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland conflicts. Conflict transformation at the same time is a delicate process, and if it is possible to handle at all, it should be handled with care, because the transformation can move both better and worse.[149]

As it has been seen, a beginning of a conflict is somewhat measurable by noticing early warnings in society. These signs are often interrelated with lack of overall happiness, welfare and content feelings in society. Such indicators are higher when education, experience, capacities, possibilities for individual or group fulfilment of human potential is low. Development of conflicts has its roots in people's possibilities and real feelings to self-fulfilment and overall content within themselves. In a different angle this approach has been described also by Curle, how peace should be seen broadly in terms of human development.[150] Even though according to Ramsbotham and others, Curle had this approach already in 1970s, only after dealing with the crisis in former Yugoslavia, he broadened his concept and practice of peacemaking to include the empowerment of individuals and civil society groups in variety of roles. From that experience his new approaches to peacebuilding from below, developed.[151] This approach has many similarities to contemporary conflict resolution method of interactive conflict resolution.

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[146] Ibid, p183, with reference to van der Merwe "Pursuing Justice and Peace in South Africa", Routledge 1989

[147] ibid, about contradiction in achieving both peace and justice p236

[148] see Pearson F., and Lounsbery M.-O., „The challenge of operationalizing key concepts in conflict resolution theory in international and subnational conflicts", in Handbook on Conflict Analysis and Resolution, p72

[149] Ibid, p73, with a reference to Lederach J.P., „Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures", „Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies", US Insitutes of Peace Press 1995

[150] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p51-52, with a reference to Curle's "Making Peace" (1971),

[151] Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015, p52

In mediation, negotiations and interactive conflict resolution, the long-lasting effect would be achieved by thinking positive-sum and win-win solutions for the sides. Zero-sum thinking undermines the negotiation process, causing delays, setbacks and repeated failures.[152] Conflict is a multifaceted process of mutual influence, therefore this should suggest strategies and tactics of influence, which are the most productive for conflict resolution and to the development of a long-term peaceful relationship.[153] Zero-sum approach not only undermines the process, but it is also making the deep prevention and peacebuilding fail. Positive-sum thinking and solution finding is crucial with the help of the mediator. It is an irreplaceable and necessary step for the peacebuilding process to be fruitful.

When the peace has been achieved, the most delicate times are to sustain the peace and one of the hardest and time consuming is the reconciliation process. In conflicts sides have mutual denial of each other, mutual victimization by other side, mutual view that other side is a source of one´s humiliation and vulnerability.[154] Implementation of peace agreements after civil war is often broken by returns to violence. Recent examples include Sudan (South Sudan), Myanmar (Karens), Russia (Chechnya), Indonesia (Aceh), Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts), Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam), Angola (Bicesse Accords), and India (Nagaland). Problems of trust and the inability of states to ensure both short- and long-term security undermine stability in the post-agreement phase.[155] There is a general phenomenon of persistence of attitudes and beliefs, even when facing new information challenging the former perception. Kelman claims that this mechanism is particularly powerful in a conflict relationship but social-psychological evidence has shown that these perceptions can change and do change and it is a challenge for scholars and practitioners of international conflict resolution to devise the means to overcome parties' resistance to change. By that Kelman argues that conflict resolution efforts must be geared to discovering possibilities to change. Therefore the claim is that when the foundation has not been laid early, the sides will continue to perceive each other similar way longer, even after the successful peacemaking. Sustaining that peace and to reconcile will be easier, when already during mediation, interactive conflict resolution and negotiations, this causal logic has been taken into consideration and appropriate mechanisms adopted.

Kelman was part of delivering Track II support for the resolution of Cyprus conflict in the early 1990s. It was seen that for mediation to be valuated successful, the levels of Track I, Track II,

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[152] Kelman „A social-psychological approach to conflict analysis and resolution", in Handbook p178
[153] Ibid, p182
[154] Ibid, p179
[155] DeRouen K. Jr., Chowdhury I., "Mediation, Peacekeeping And Civil War Peace Agreements" in journal Defence and Peace Economics 29:2, 2018, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2016.1173439, p130

including interactive conflict resolution must be carried through in parallel.[156] The approach is that this kind of civilian level facilitation of communication should be kept in mind and promoted by mediators already while working on Track I level facilitation of negotiations. If there is no other consultant available, then the knowledgeable mediator could and should promote lower level initiatives at the already same time when Track I is working in official level. A local level work will add up to big change finally[157]and those linkages have to be consciously planned.[158] It is important to act on every level possible but also keep the larger picture in mind.

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The post-Cold War era had an idealistic start when the Soviet Union and its communist system collapsed and it seemed that liberal values will free the world, everyone will soon live the prosperous life of the west and the conflicts and wars will be the thing of the past. This would have meant that managing international crisis will soon be distant and only something for the history books. Already then honourable thinker of realpolitik, Mearsheimer and later Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlfort argued that the new era will most likely be even more difficult and unpredictable, because the collapse caused the loss of balance of power and when the US will return to isolationism, the world see many more conflicts.[159] Seeing that the polarization, confrontation, and violence will not end, the conflict resolution as a discipline was not disappearing anywhere. Even more, the post-Cold war era saw many conflicts that were not resolved with previous methods and the discipline needed new approaches and contemporary handling.[160]

In the second chapter the mediation as one method to conflict handling, its development, principles and methods were studied Measuring also its success and searching for new approaches which would be able to deal with conflicts of the 21st century. The aim was to explore what is mediation and how is it carried through, therefore which kind of capabilities are needed to be a mediator. These capabilities are the prerequisites to be able to get such position and seat behind the

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[156] See also Ronald J. Fisher approach on and stressing the importance of interactive conflict resolution in the Handbook, pp328-338

[157] Ernstorfer A., Chigas D., Vaughan-Lee H., "From Little to Large: When Does Peacebuilding Add Up?", in journal Peacebuilding & Development, Volume 10, 2015 - Issue 1, (2015), available at Taylor and Francis online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15423166.2015.1009323

[158] Ibid, p75

[159] Mearsheimer J., „Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0017.pdf, and Brooks S., Ikenberry J., Wohlforth W., „Don´t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchement", International Security Vol 37, Issue 3 Winter 2012/2013

[160] See from the text Curle realization about the need to develop his mediation methods after the experience of wars in former Yugoslavia.

table, whether it is Sweden, Norway or anyone else as intermediary. The goal was also to challenge the thought of mediation being a measure of light prevention and it was found how mediation as a discipline is more and more moving towards considering long-term peacebuilding. Even though mediation was first seen as light prevention method, providing immediate relief, the UN guidance and later development saw the methods moving more towards the field of deep prevention. It was seen necessary to keep bigger picture in mind already when making the first steps of peacemaking with the help of intervening third party. The conflicts happen between individuals, groups, states, it can be cultural clashes, fighting for power. Therefore some of the researched studies and arguments were driven from interdisciplinary fields, including from areas which are more related to micro-level psychology and macro level social-psychology. Main recommendation would be that intervening measures, including mediation, must include more levels of involvement, not only on state official and international but also civil societal level, keeping the large picture of peacebuilding in mind.

In relation to the first and second chapter, in the third chapter it will be studied more specifically how Sweden and Norway have developed their image and status as neutral states, peacebuilders, including in the role of mediators. In addition, the development of their capacities as mediators will be analysed, their methods and strategies and whether they represent the development from light to deep prevention, as discovered to be the general tendency. This analyze and focus on specific cases will help to answer the main question of the research and as well as test the main statement.

3. SWEDEN AND NORWAY IN THE ROLE OF MEDIATORS

3.1 Methodology and methods

As a reference to the beginning, current research is positive, empirical and explanatory[161], answering questions why the states are successful, how they have managed to achieve such role. Explanations point to causes of events, identify general causal effects, and reveal the causal mechanisms that produce them. Explanation answers "why" about causal effects and also "how" about causal mechanisms. Even though, this is a retrospective explanation, the outcome as a list of conditions or a model would serve in a prospective manner for other small powers in order to build their status as international mediators. Social scientific explanations provide policy makers and society at large with tools for social change.[162] As there is no such specific level theory for the success of small powers as mediators, the goal is to have a theory generating research that will also serve as a mean to develop new hypotheses. In order to carry through explanatory research, the first goal was to read the selected scientific literature to see how different scientists have analyzed the topic, what objects have they chosen for their research analysis, what scientific issues have they investigated. In the first subchapter an analysis has been performed on an existing scientific literature. The main sources for this analyze were scientific articles exploring Sweden's and Norway's status in the international stege, their role, image and work as peacebuilders. Two of the main books studied were: "Small States Status Seeking" by Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B Neumann and "Small-State Mediation in International Conflicts" by Jacob Eriksson.

The main theory for basis of the research is role theory and public diplomacy, while social constructivism has been given a special emphasis, as it deals with ideas, identities and constructed status of the actors in international scene. Having identified the key scientists in the discipline, the theory has been explored. This was made in order to specify the key concepts, criteria, theoretical postulates, and statements which would help to conceptualise the analysis. It was also to show the relevance of the theories for current empirical research.

In order to answer to the research question, model was needed for the study. The research model, which was seen the most appropriate was a two-step approach, first an analytical and abstractive and second a case-study of Norway's and Sweden's specific mediation experiences. The first part enables to find answers from previous studies and other researchers´ standpoints. The second part would help to find the key conditions from specific cases, the interrelation of the conditions and how they led to Norway and Sweden being mediators. The model sees the dedication to analyze these

[161] See Toshkov D., "Research Design in Political Science", Palgrave 2016, pp30-31
[162] ibid, p37

two states without specifically performing any comparison. Instead, the focus is in the factors that states/decision makers take into account and what has led to making the decision to choose a mediator. This two-step model of analytical approach and a case-study of the mediators should produce sufficient data to accomplish the goal of the research, i. e., "identifying the factors that were taken into account when choosing a mediator for conflict resolution." The result would be a list of various factors.

Thirdly, an adequate method or methods of the research had to be chosen. The main characteristics of the study being of political science, international relations and the research question already excluded or made it difficult to use some of the methods, e.g. quantitative analysis. According to the main theme of the study, qualitative data gathering and analyzing would be appropriate. Qualitative research strategies are considered useful because their application offers greater possibilities to establish attitudes and beliefs. They also allow explaining "why" and "how" rather than "what" is happening, they show the dynamics of the evolution of a phenomenon and they are relatively inexpensive; they help creating new hypotheses.[163] Therefore the specific methods to be chosen were more or less limited to the methods available for a qualitative research, gathering non-numerical data either through interviews, questions, involving focus groups, making observations, making field notes, performing qualitative content analysis of scientific and popular articles, biographical researches and most of all, analyzing the scientific literature and primary written sources like documents.[164] The last two methods were the main ones chosen for carrying through the study.

Constructivists would usually generate or develop a theory inductively, starting from specific facts, empirical observations and proceed to theoretical generalisations of given facts. It was endeavoured to apprehend behaviour of decision makers through studying the sources for their values, beliefs, attitudes, criteria for making the choice leading to the peace facilitation. In addition to qualitative methods, a theoretical methods of analysing will be added. More specifically the description method is used to present key facts of the topic, research object and phenomena and process of mediation. Secondly, abstraction method allows for theoretical thinking and logic accumulated from the gathered data to provide reasonable scientific explanation of the reality. According to the research model and qualitative research methods used, the evaluation and rephrasing of specific research questions were carried through. This led to specified questions: Is the success of Sweden and Norway result of their status and role in international standing? Is the position to be in

[163] See Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė I., Rakutienė S., "Writing a Bachelor's Thesis in the field of Political Science", Vytautas Magnus University Didactical Guidelines 2013, p52

[164] Hesse-Biber S., Leavy P., "Approaches to Qualitative Research, Oxford Un. Press 2004, p3

such role as an end in itself or is it a mean which does serve some more meaningful end within their foreign policy?

Fourth, the data collection and data analysis will be carried through. The analysis is done of the researches which have concentrated on the success of Sweden and Norway. This has been done with the help of theoretical perspectives of role theory and public diplomacy. The analysis would lead to generalisation and evaluation and the formulation of answers to the general and specific research questions.

The author is aware of the critique of qualitative research methods, providing not objective but subjective view of the world, not being consistent, and being difficult to compare or generalise. In order to reduce subjectivity, a two-step approach was used, adding specific cases to the qualitative abstraction. In the case-studies therefore, the approach is not only to look for and interpret what different international relations scientists believe being important factors for the success of Sweden and Norway as mediators. The aim is also to look for primary sources and specifically find the facts, which led to their position. While studying different cases, it is not the aim, purpose of current research to give an exhaustive overview of the cases, where Sweden and Norway have been involved. Each case would require a separate scientific research of their own. It is instead the aim to look at the specific moment or causal process which led to their facilitative mandate in the peace processes. For better understanding of the conflict and the development of Sweden´s and Norway´s engagement, at least the basic facts of the cases must be presented. In each case there are different issues which led to the selection of a facilitator and this part of the conflicts is the certain object under the surveillance.

3.2. The success of Sweden and Norway as mediatiors:
Historical and analytical approach through theoretical perspectives

This subchapter is dedicated to historical and analytical approach to study from researches and books how Sweden and Norway have gradually built their status, role and image as peace nations. According to the statement to be defended, this has served as a prerequisite for providing different initiatives in order to make the world safer. One of these initiatives is being a facilitator and a mediator in conflicts. As it was written in the second chapter, mediation is only one method to use in peace processes. Sweden and Norway, therefore, are not only in a role of mediators. The states have been participating in many areas of peace, to reduce violence and human suffering. The image that each of them have built is a neutral state, who wants to be peaceful, spread the peace around the world. For these purposes many methods are being used from development aid to military missions, helping to proceed with negotiations, in between. The development of their identity and status is being studied in this

subchapter and concluded with its implications on their own and other actors' foreign policy decisions.

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Conventional understanding would see superpowers like the United States to be initiatives and allowed to be the third party in the negotiations.[165] Instead smaller powers like Sweden and Norway have been in the hearts of difficult conflicts, affecting the global stage. According to Eriksson, Norway and Sweden are prime examples of small states who are accepted as mediators due to their non-threatening political posture.[166] *"They do not normally have the capability to directly threaten the security of the parties, or otherwise coerce them into an agreement. Instead, they tend to use tools of moral and intellectual persuasion to their advantage. Their position within the international system is often a criteria used to deem them suitable, often characterized by existing reputations for skilled diplomacy, regional expertise or impartiality, based on a history of finely tuned diplomatic history."* The reasoning described by Eriksson fits with the theoretical assumptions of constructivist role theory and main arguments of public diplomacy. Empirical analysis of specific cases later on will take a closer look at different negotiations where either Sweden or Norway have been in the middle and how they have managed to acquire this role. This would provide answer to the research question and also helps to critically analyze the common perception of a success of small-state mediators described by Eriksson.

Important uniting factor is the shared history of the states, as for most of the 19th century, Sweden and Norway belonged into a union ruled by same monarch. A significant difference developed after the World War II, when Norway decided to be a founding member of NATO, while Sweden decided to stay as a bystander. This, in the first glance, seems relevant, especially considering the importance of neutrality in mediation. It could pose a question about the real neutrality of Norway and somewhat made their image-building more difficult. At the same time Sweden is belonging to the EU, while Norway has formally stayed out of this normative power. Yet, they are both very successful of attracting the conflicting parties.

In the post-Cold War era new peace diplomacy opened up a possibility for non-state actors to participate in a peace process and thus states lost the monopoly of being the sole actors in peace diplomacy. Simultaneously various international organizations like the UN and regional as well as

[165] See Eriksson J., "Small State Mediation in International Conflicts: Diplomacy and Negotiation in Israel-Palestine", I.B. Tauris Pub. 2015,
[166] ibid,

nongovernmental organizations were involved in peacemaking. Greig and Diehl conclude that there were 64% more mediation attempts during the 1990s than during the entire 1945–1989 period,[167] and this trend seems to have continued after the turn of the millennium. As part of this process several small states like Norway have been profiled as peacebuilders and they have determinately built their brand of a peace mediator.[168] Norway led the way to the new peace diplomacy and the Norwegian government set peace diplomacy as its priority in the 1990s. In just under ten years after the end of the Cold War, Norway was involved as facilitator or mediator in 14 peace processes, from the Oslo-Process, Colombia, Guatemala, Mali, and Sri Lanka. Requests for assistance to several other conflict areas has been turned down for lack of capacity.[169] Through various types of mediation and bridge-building efforts, also Sweden been contributing to a peaceful solution of regional conflicts. Bjerfeld sees how these missions also give status and prestige to the state which acts as a mediator.[170]

The Swedish identity as a small, neutral state in international relations, has guided its foreign policy, and contributed to its internationalist vision and strong support of multilateralism.[171] Sweden has worked with NGOs, international organizations and other small states to strengthen peace and advance humanitarian goals. As a neutral small state it has acted as a critic, mediator between the blocs, peacekeeper and donor of foreign aid and has gained the respect and confidence of many on the international arena. Critics argue that Sweden has made claims to be the "moral superpower" of the world and the self-perception is apparent in the national rhetoric.[172] Conflict prevention turned into a core practice in Sweden's foreign policy during the 1990's. Before that they had experiences such as the mediation undertaken in the years 1965–1968 during the Vietnam War between the United States and North Vietnam/NLF as well as Olof Palme acting as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative during the years 1980–1982 in the war between Iran and Iraq. All three cases will be studied more closely in the last part of current research.

The legacy of tragically died UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and his peacekeeping initiatives and emphasis on preventive diplomacy impacted the development of Swedish policies. Mediation efforts by prominent Swedes include Carl Bildt's assignments in the Balkans as well as Jan Eliasson's UN-related mediation-tasks in the Middle-East and Africa. Jan Eliasson has been an

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[167] The World Bank study "Pathways to Peace" March 2018, reference to Greig J. M., Diehl P.,. 2012. International Mediation. Cambridge, MA: Polity, and the second reference to Themmer, L., Wallensteen. 2011. "Armed Conflict, 1946–2010." Journal of Peace Research, 48. Study at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337

[168] See Lehti p56

[169] See Annex 2 on Norway´s activities in peacemaking

[170] Bjerfeld U., "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics 1945-90", 1995, see reference above

[171] See Björkdahl, p74

[172] ibid,

individual becoming synonymous with the efforts of Swedish mediation.[173] He has held several posts in relation to peacemaking in his lifetime and was involved in high profile mediation efforts, mostly under the umbrella of international organizations. In early stages of Iraq/Iran conflict, where the main duty was given to the Prime Minister Olof Palme, during 1980-1982 Eliasson was part of the diplomatic mission, serving as personal advisor to Palme. As part of the UN and OSCE missions, he was involved as a third party in Darfur, Azerbaijan, Balkan and other conflicts. Sweden's participation in 1995 in the first UN preventive deployment mission as part of the country's internationalist and multilateral vision of international relations in Macedonia added further to the weight of Sweden's role as a conflict prevention mediator.

Annika Björkdahl argues that after the end of the Cold War, the Swedish foreign policy identity was in need of reconstruction and selection of the conflict prevention idea was part of the incremental reconstruction of Sweden's foreign policy.[174] Björkland specifically relies on the social constructivist theory for analysing Sweden's move toward type of foreign policy, emphasizing conflict prevention, including through mediation. She explains that social constructivism should not be seen as competing with traditional international relations theories, but complementing those. It expands the traditional theoretical discourse and broadens the focus of the study of international relations by paying more attention to ideational phenomena.[175] She explains that when the idea of conflict prevention re-emerged in the international arena, it was an idea that easily fit with Swedish internationalist visions. According to Sweden's State Secretary, conflict prevention was seen as an idea naturally resonating to Swedish domestic values, vision, tradition and practices.[176] It is also shown later on how a prominent peace facilitator Jan Egeland saw Norway´s image. He underlined that it had great potential due to its positive international image, substantial policy consensus, few conflicting foreign policy interests and increasing funds for foreign assistance.[177] Björkdahl argues that it has become a conflict prevention has become a norm today in international relations.[178] According to this point of view, Sweden and Norway as the states which have already gained the status and role as neutral peacemakers, attract potential conflicting parties more and more.

Mediation is a core task of the United Nations which is often carried through with the help of the member states. According to the Sweden MFA documents the UN is the most significant global

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[173] See Brouwer reference to Svensson and Wallensteen, p464

[174] Björkdahl A., "From Norm to Idea", PhD dissertation, Lund Un. 2002, available at http://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/4776970/4770178.pdf,

[175] ibid, p25

[176] ibid, p75

[177] Skanland "Norway is a Peace Nation", 2010, p37, reference to Egeland 1988

[178] see Björkdahl p 72

mediation actor, and it is often the only one seen as impartial and entrusted to work in conflict situations.[179] This shows that Sweden itself sees impartiality is an important factor that is considered by the conflict parties. Höglund and Svensson discuss the country's self-perception as well as international image or brand. Thus a reputation of being a skilled and effective peacemaker is important in order to gain visibility and a position in international community. Being a 'peace nation' was also about international branding but having the peacemaking agenda was and is also part of national identity building. It is a narrative which presents a small northern country as 'a great, moral power'.

In 1999, Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan, was presented to the Swedish Government.[180] One of the priorities that were set out was strengthening the Swedish capacities of international conflict prevention, including mediation. As a self-image, Sweden has officially prioritized its role of conflict prevention, peace support, and peacebuilding as engagements in the UN.[181] Sweden participates actively in the processes aimed at the capacity to prevent armed conflicts, including through support to the UN Mediation Support Unit. Sweden Minister of Foreign Affairs Margaret Wallström in her recent speech acknowledged that "We are making a difference. Right now we are negotiating a resolution on a ceasefire in Syria to continue to ensure humanitarian assistance to the millions of people in need. We have a leading role on issues concerning children in armed conflicts. We have considerably strengthened the UN's work on women, peace and security." From the same speech, interesting excerpts by Wallström should be highlighted in the context of current research: "We are making a difference. Right now we are negotiating a resolution on a ceasefire in Syria to continue to ensure humanitarian assistance to the millions of people in need. We have a leading role on issues concerning children in armed conflicts. We have considerably strengthened the UN's work on women, peace and security. /--/ in Myanmar, and we are working for a solution to the crisis and for those who are guilty of crimes against humanity to be brought to justice. /--/ With North Korea we are pushing for a peaceful solution and the implementation of the sanctions imposed on the country. /--/ We are a driving force on the UN Security Council for finding a long-term political solution in Yemen. /--/ The Government is working for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, based on international la. /--/ We are promoting security in the world."[182] Therefore, not only in the past, but as of now Sweden, even though a small power, sees its special difference making role.

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[179] Opinion piece by Sweden's Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström and Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo Soini, http://www.government.se/opinion-pieces/2016/01/mediation-the-real-weapon-for-peace/

[180] See Joenniemi p135

[181] Sweden MFA, http://www.government.se/government-policy/sweden-and-the-un/swedens-priorities-in-the-un/

[182] Wallström speech http://www.government.se/speeches/2018/02/the-governments-statement-of-foreign-policy-2018/

In building its role and status as peace mediators, both Norway and Sweden have dedicated many resources to the scientific research in their universities. Almost all scholars specializing in the field of mediation are affiliated either to Swedish or Norwegian Institutes. Swedish studies outnumber Norwegian ones. The strongest and most recourses go to the studies in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in the Uppsala University and the Lund University's Peace and Conflict studies. In Norway the research specializing in the field has located mainly in the University of Oslo, plus special institutes like the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Peace Research Institute Oslo analysed periodically mediation related themes.[183]

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Harvard Leira argues that Norway has obsessively been a status seeker for already 150 years.[184] Leira sees that Norway has sought for a status for contributing to world peace and today has established such prestige that everyone in need of peace and reconciliation, knows they can turn to Norway. Already in n 1937 Halvdan Koht wrote in the Foreign Affairs how permanent neutrality was obtained by national consensus in 1898 already before Norway was officially separated from Sweden. In 1902, still before independence, the same claim was unanimously adopted in the Storting. Koht argued how historical conditions paved the way for such attitude, because since 1720 Norway had only had seven years of war, while from 1815 until the time of the writing, no Norwegian soldier had had to fight.[185]

The Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Norwegian foreign policy states that "Norway rarely appears on its own" in the sphere of peace promotion and reconciliation but engages itself as a general rule in combination with other actors, above all the UN. The report shows that Norway was then involved in peace diplomacy in more than 20 countries and the more specific list provided offers information on the cases of Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Middle-East, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Philippines and East-Timor.

Examples of the cases will be given a closer look in the last part of the research. It can be argued that seeds of Norwegian peace diplomacy were sown already with the pre-independence national consensus. More conscious mediation efforts began only during the Cold War though. The initiative in Guatemala in 1980s and 'Geneva/Oslo interface, with ICRC playing a focal role' in 1989

[183] see Lehti p14
[184] Neumann and Carvalho, p22
[185] Koht H., article at the Foreign Affairs January 1937, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/norway/1937-01-01/neutrality-and-peace)

led the way far strategic changes in Norway's foreign policy.[186] Working as a State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1999 Egeland developed the so-called 'Norwegian model' that preferred to work at ad-hoc setups. He included Norwegians having networks in the relevant areas and fearing that the codification of the peace efforts he had initiated would hamper their development. A momentum occurred when the MFA established a separate section to deal with Peace and Reconciliation in 2000. Egeland's initiated Norwegian model rests on Norway's status as a small state and confidence in the country's impartiality as to the conflicts to be tackled as well as Norway's ability and competence to handle the issues at stake. Another essential ingredient consists of a rather flexible way of cooperation as well as a division of labour between the Norwegian Government, NGOs and academic institutions. Essential feature in there is the endurance and the long-term perspective applied in approaching the settlement of conflicts. As it was discussed in the second chapter on the future of the discipline, also for Norwegians the aim is not only achieving a cease-fire and signing a treaty. It is more so to set in motion and support political, economic and social processes leading to a durable peace. This endurance and setting long-term aims rests on a broad political consensus underlying the promotion of peace and reconciliation.[187] As was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen, "We are able to keep up our commitment regardless of changing governments or political currents, and we remain engaged even at difficult stages in a peace process".[188]

The New York Times correspondent Frank Bruni recalls a frenzy of Norwegian peacemaking that has put peace alongside oil and timber as one of this country's signature exports: "*Over the last decade, Norwegians have had a hand in peace talks between Communist rebels and the Philippine government; Croatia and Yugoslavia; and Colombia's government and the FARC rebel movement. Norwegians have ventured into Cyprus and Somalia and Sudan*". Norwegian negotiators were able in February 2002 to broker a power-sharing agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. Norway was gaining global fame through peacemaking, Bruni comments that Norway seems to be the international capital of peace.[189] One participant, Marianne Heiberg, wife of then foreign minister Johan Jorgen Holst recalled the collective Norwegian pride how it had demonstrated international influence.[190]

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186 Lehti study,
187 ibid,
188 Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, in "Norwegian Perspectives on International Peace and Security", Government White Paper nr. 11,1998
189 Bruni F., A Nation That Exports Oil, Herring and Peace', New York Times, 21 December 2002.
190 See Henriksen p80

Neumann maps the historical legacies of Norway's peace nation image from four sources. Firstly, he emphasizes the importance of Norwegian involvement in the Anglo-American peace movement at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly, he pinpoints a link between Norway's strong missionary tradition and peace image. Thirdly, he also links peace activity to internationalist workers' movement. And fourthly, he underlines Norway's active role in the League of Nations as well as in the UN. In particular, Fridtjof Nansen's role as a national hero and an early pioneer of peacemaking and humanitarian work is prioritized.

Peace has long had particular resonance in Norwegian foreign policy thinking also according to Skanland. He shows it has been established that Norway has had a peace discourse and peace tradition at least since the 1890s.[191] The use of 'peace' as a central concept in the political mobilization for Norwegian independence and the annual presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo have been important in tying Norwegian national identity to peace. The peace discourse consequently came to dominate the foreign policy of the newborn state more than a hundred years ago. This weakened during the Cold War, but remained an important organizing concept in foreign policy discourse throughout the 20th century. Norwegian exceptionalism, underlining its special abilities in promoting peace, international justice and humanitarian values, appears to be an important part of Norway's identity and self-image. Skanland picks up four elements on which Norway's image or brand as a great peacemaker has been built for national and international audience. Firstly, he mentions the advantage of smallness which underlines that Norway lacks colonial burden that is often intertwined with great power interests. Secondly, due to its smallness it does not have any reason to show off its muscles and thus Norway as a mediator is capable to form a confidential relationship and it would rather take the role of a facilitator than a mediator. Thirdly, Norway has deep roots in investing in peacemaking and it holds a natural legacy of humanitarianism and peace activism. Fourthly, there is a close cooperation among civil servants, NGOs and academic institutions in Norway. It is also brough out a principle is not to look for quick fixes.[192] This kind of a combination of several actors and operating with private actors is also seen by Jan Egeland as main characteristic of the 'Norwegian model' as mediator. In many terms new peace diplomacy transformed traditional state-to-state diplomacy more into a networked one in which the states are also networked with private actors and which also diplomatised non-state actors as they are part of the mediation process.

[191] Skanland study, p37

[192] from the speech "Norway's guiding principles for peace and reconciliation" by Borge Brende, available at https://www.brookings.edu/events/norways-guiding-principles-for-peace-and-reconciliation/

Also Joenniemi acknowledges peace-related themes having for long been integrally related to the Norwegian self-understanding.[193] He refers already to the promoted talks between Turkey and Greece in the war in 1922, for which Norwegian Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements the same year. Overall, he left a legacy called the 'Nansen-tradition' in Norwegian policies, and that tradition remained notable also during the years of the Cold War with Norway being involved in various processes of peace diplomacy such as facilitating meetings between parties to the war in Vietnam and initiating talks between Thailand and China. Crucially, the experiences gained and the linkages created within Norway implied that after the Cold War there was a preparedness within the political leadership as well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to respond positively to initiatives taken and proposals made by various internationally well connected individuals or NGOs active in different conflict-prone areas. This openness, the broadening of the actors involved, engagement in networking and willingness to provide space also for other type of efforts than conventional government-centered diplomacy showed that Norway was able to spearhead peacemaking.[194]

The gained experiences implied that peace diplomacy was provided with an increasingly central standing in Norway's foreign policy. Engagement in bridge-building had already been singled out as one of the aims to be pursued in the field of foreign policy in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament in 1989,[195] but it turned almost self-evident after the signing of the Oslo Accords that Norway should engage itself in various peace-related activities and also aspire to create additional preparedness and competences in the field. Whereas the promotion of peace had previously been seen as an integral part of the development policies, it turned more autonomous and was upgraded into an important part of the foreign policy in its own right.[196]

As an example of the image perceived from outside actors, Hillary Clinton in Oslo 2012 as the US Secretary of State said: "In issues of security and peace, on human rights and development, Norway has no better or closer partner than the US." The importance of being a close ally to the US has served well for Norway. The US has often been the main actor in helping to solve different conflicts around the world, but using coercive ways and its power. Norway is known as an ally and at the same time is considered as more neutral, non-coercive, reliable intermediary.

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[193] See Joenniemi in the Lehti study, p123, also Sigmund Olav Bekken in 2007, underlines identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy. Thesis presented at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

[194] according to Joenniemi the tradition was mentioned for example by Foreign Minister Støre in his presentation on Norway as a nation of peace, by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, 'Norge som fredsnasjon – myte eller virklighet?'. Speech at NUPI, 24 of April 2006.

[195] Report to the Storting, Stortingsmelding no. 11 (1989–90))

[196] See Government White Paper nr. 19 (1995–1996).)

Conflict resolution and contributions to reconciliation are key elements of Norwegian development policy. Norway is currently engaged in a number of initiatives and processes, for example in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Philippines. With the proposed increase of NOK 20 million, overall support for work in the field of peace, reconciliation and democracy will total NOK 436 million. According to recent press releace by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts needs to be even stepped up[197]. "*Norwegian engagement in peace and reconciliation work is more important than ever, and the government is proposing to step up these efforts in 2018. At the same time, we intend to increase our support for implementation of the Colombian peace agreement*," said Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende.

According to the Foreign of Norway, it has been a long-term policy, a long-term willingness to provide assistance of Norway to promote peace and reconciliation.[198]. The report states: "Norway has pursued a stable, predictable policy in the areas of development assistance and peace work. This policy is based on a spirit of solidarity and a long-term perspective, and has been maintained by successive Norwegian governments. There is a strong national consensus on foreign policy, including on development assistance and peace work. Norway has consistently demonstrated a willingness to talk to all parties to a conflict." For Nordic countries, peace diplomacy has offered a new kind of opportunity to gain an important role in global politics. Norway was a pioneer of new peace diplomacy in the early 1990s but Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have all, in one form or another, adopted peacemaking and conflict resolution in their foreign policy agendas.[199]

In their research Kellehen and Taubee discovered that Norway has developed a domestic consensus that it should actively do what it can to promote international peace. Through this it has developed an honest broker image, at least partly resulting from its decades of advocacy for, and involvement in, the problems of developing countries. Norway lacks any history of modern colonialism or interventionism and has been able to present itself as a credible neutral third party. During the Cold War, even before obtaining oil wealth, Norwegian governments charted an independent path. Although a member of NATO, Norwegians did not permit bases or troops to their territory. Norwegian involvement in peacemaking efforts has benefited from a flexible, carefully considered, mutually respectful government–NGO partnership. Oil wealth means that Norway can afford to pursue its selectively focused and long-term peace initiatives.[200]

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[197] according to the press release 2017-10-12 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/peace_reconcilation/id2573684/

[198] Norway's approach to peace and reconciliation work, MFA Norway, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/norway-peace-work/id446704/

[199] Lehti M., Saarinen J., "Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts" in "Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation", Tampere Peace Research Institute, 2014, p13

[200] see Kellehen and Taulbee p482-483

Until a few years ago, the number of conflicts in the world had dropped significantly, from a high level just after the end of the Cold War. However, more recent research shows an increase in the number of conflicts. The response to this should be even more engagement by the international community and by Norway.

Norway has a range of tools available for peace and reconciliation work and is able to take a flexible approach. Strategic use of development aid makes it possible for us to support negotiating processes and to reinforce peace settlements, for instance through monitoring mechanisms and peacebuilding efforts. Through peace and reconciliation work, we support local, regional and international efforts to bring about lasting political solutions. At the request of the parties to a conflict, Norway can facilitate talks on possible pathways to peace and on how the suffering caused by war can be reduced and international law respected.[201]

At large, Norway's engagement and participation has over the years consisted in one of its forms of acting as a mediator but above all a facilitator of negotiations with the responsibility for success lying basically with the protagonists themselves. Moreover, the country has contributed to a creation of back channels for secret negotiations and been an actor in the context of international coalitions set up to tackle a particular conflict. Norway has in cases such as Burundi, Guatemala, Haiti, Aceh, Mali, Nepal, Cyprus, Sudan, East Timor, West Balkans, the Great Lakes region and West Africa chosen to support other leading actors, but has, on occasion, also taken the lead in processes of peace promotion. In general, the aim has been one of focusing on a limited number of cases and to bring them to a successful conclusion. Furthermore, there has been a willingness to discuss with all of the parties of a conflict and it has also been of importance that Norway retains good relations with all of the major actors on the scene of international relations.

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It is possible to prevent violent conflicts, yet most of the time we fail. We have spent hours in the past negotiating responses, but we have mostly been unable to put the same enduring effort into prevention. The consequences are disastrous. This needs to change. We must recommit to mediation.[202] Status is a key driver in the policies of the small states in everyday life of international society, claim Iver

[201] Norway's MFA report at https:/www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/facilitation/id708238

[202] Opinion piece by Sweden's Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström and Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo Soini, http://www.government.se/opinion-pieces/2016/01/mediation-the-real-weapon-for-peace/

Neumann and Benjamin de Carvalho.[203] According to these authors, small states do not have other option than to making themselves useful to greater powers. It is about being noticed and seen by taking part of responsibility for matters of international peace and security. [204] When others hold beliefs about persistent characteristics of an actor, we can say the actor has a reputation for those characteristics, or for the behaviours implied by them. Since a state can have a reputation for beliefs about any persistent characteristic, a state can have a reputations for many different traits, such as reputation for military capacity, for a public that tolerates the costs of war, for reliable generals, etc.[205] The reputation can bring status but must be kept analytically distinct. Reputation is tied to identity, to how the self is seen by others. According to authors Norway's reputation as a peace mediator leads to it being regularly approached by state and non-state actors seeking its help in brokering deals, and so Norway is recognized in the field of peace and reconciliation. Prestige may be translated into power or influence. Neorealists expect that small states of similar size have similar foreign policies.[206] According to Rose, systemic pressures and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being strong enough to determine the specific details of state behaviour.[207] So could it be that Norway and Sweden and similar states, for example Finland and Switzerland, have knowingly or unconsciously, due to the systemic pressures, pursued such policy to become neutral actors who at the same time are often helpful to big powers.

According to constructivist point of view, in the next step, after getting institutionalized power, small states could use their leverage to shape the norms of world politics, socially construct a new, more favourable identities in their relationships.[208] Annan 1998: *Small states contribution in the World is the glue of progressive international cooperation for the common good*.[209] President Kennedy also stressed the need for small nations to take part in the great project of international cooperation. "Small nations", he said, "can and must help build a world peace.[210] It is indeed in the interest of a small state, in order not to be swept away or swallowed, to work for the international order. As today there is no viable course of action for a small state to become bigger in territory, their status can come not from size but bigger moral involvement. Small states want to take share of the credit held by great powers and they ally with them. They do not compete for power, or see it as a

[203] see Neumann & Carvalho “Small status seeking: Norway's quest for international standing” 2014
[204] see p3
[205] the authors are referring to Dafoe and others on p3
[206] p8
[207] p9
[208] see p9 reference to Christine Ingebritsen and reference to 1988 Jan Egeland's book “Impotent Superpower - Potent Small State…”
[209] the UN press release, https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980715.sgsm6639.html
[210] Kofi Annan, from the same speach

zero-sum game, knowing their power limitations, they seek to status as a good power - increase their status and be perceived to be good and reliable partners.[211]

It is agreed that being asked to work as a facilitator between conflict parties requires some kind of status. A role that has been achieved, the role that others see an actor in the international scene.[212] Through constructivist role theory, a state as an intermediary itself can see a specific self-image, e.g. seeing itself as a good mediator-facilitator. At the same time other international actors can see the same actors' abilities differently. In theoretical part it was shown that both international and domestic policies shape the identity of an actor. In case of Sweden and Norway, it is clear that in addition to international activity, the identity within domestic policies have backed up the perception of neutrality. As it was discovered, the domestic policies have been very consistent in this area. Sweden and Norway have created its identity and efficiently recreated it repeatedly. In a way they exactly chose their identity. After seeing their initial success as contributors to peace, there was a strategic decision to follow that path and the actions followed through. Gradually, following the decision, through actions the identity was fixed. Skanland also sees the Norway peace builder´s discourse as intentionally constructed.[213]

Norway has built its role as a peace nation by supporting stabilisation measures, enabling capacity building and confidence-building measures in countries in conflicts, like Somalia, Myanmar, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. They also to continue to develop expertise on issues of transitional justice and follow up the Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security in all peace and reconciliation work.[214] This shows the complexity of the modern mediation. Not only facilitation of peace talks but also steps before and after which deal with matters that lasting peace depends on are taken.

Reason that also explains Sweden´s and Norway´s success is their comprehensive and thorough work on mediation. According to Iver Neumann Scandinavian countries have consistently spent sizeable resources on systems maintenance in such diverse areas as institution-building – the League of Nations and the UN, for instance; peacekeeping; development and disaster aid; and the role of third parties' and a more active role as a peace mediator is merely a logical continuation of this approach As Norway is facilitating talks, at the same time they are collecting and systematizing experience gained from peace processes and knowledge about trends in international conflict

[211] see p10 and a reference to Peter Lawler concept on the "good state" and Scandinavian Institutionalism

[212] see self-image in role-theory by Harschi and Aggestam,

[213] Skånland H. Ø., "'Norway is a peace nation': A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement", in journal Cooperation and Conflict, 45 (I), 2010, available at SAGE Pub. DOI: 10.1177/0010836709347212, p34-54

[214] ibid,

resolution. Continuing to build and develop expertise in the field of peace research through collaboration between Norwegian research institutions and research institutions in Europe, the US and in emerging states. Strengthening the capacity of the UN and regional organisations in the areas of conflict prevention and mediation.[215]

Lehti brings out Iver Neumann´s comprehensive interpretation on the interest of small states towards peace mediation from the perspective of the history of diplomacy. According to him, Scandinavian countries 'have consistently spent sizeable resources on systems maintenance in such diverse areas as institution-building – the League of Nations and the UN, for instance; peacekeeping; development and disaster aid; and the role of third parties' and a more active role as a peace mediator is merely a logical continuation of this approach.[216]

Third party's activity in conflicts has been part of traditional diplomacy as long as there has been modern diplomacy but in a classic setting third party has participated in crisis management, for example, with military intervention and with guaranteeing peace treaties. This has been great power activity and while a great power has acted as a mediator, it has applied power mediation to persuade warring parties. Small states, however, adopted 'the weakest form of third party diplomatisation' and acted merely as a facilitator 'that offers its services not as an active broker, but as a discreet presence with certain human and material resources to offer. This is one of the reasons to choose small states, weaker powers. They act merely as facilitators, not as active brokers, but offering a discreet presence. No one is being pushed. "We have a positive image, seen as a small friendly, peaceful, bridge-building land," said Hilde Henriksen Waage of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. According to Waage´s research on Suez crisis, Norway approached to peaceful methods of conflict solutions already during the times of the Cold War. When Suez Canal appeared to be soon blocked by the new Egyptian government, Norway was deeply shocked by the initiative of France and the UK to militarily attack Egypt. Norway was not too neutral itself due to their shipping amounts through the canal, but still sided with the US in finding peaceful ways of settling the conflict.[217]

What has made it easier for Norway to get the position behind the facilitator table has been patience, long-term broad public and political support for continuation of such policy. When such an opportunity arises, it is quick to take advantage on it. The opportunity, as it will be discovered in the last part of the study, could arise from previous accounts and activities in particular area. Sweden and

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[215] Norway's peace and reconciliation policy according to the MFA https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/facilitation/id708238/

[216] Lehti,

[217] Waage H. H., "Norway and a Major International Crisis: Suez - The Very Difficult Case", in journal Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol 9, Issue 3, 1998 available at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299808406100, p234-235

Norway have decided to be among the very largest contributors to global development assistance as measured by a percentage of GDP and per capita. Their contributions also ranks high in absolute terms. In the United Nations and NATO peace support operations, Norway's contribution of troops measured per capita has been, among the largest in those organisations. Norway has held the chairmanship of the OSCE and membership of the UN Security Council. Norwegian Special Forces under US Command are fighting alongside their American colleagues in a desolate part of Afghanistan. Sweden participates in similar initiatives around the world.

The question, then, is why does a state with apparently nothing to do in distant conflicts stretch its diplomatic capability to solve them. With few historic links, what are the strategic interests and economic gains donate close to one percent of its GDP to development? The neutrality and altruist motives on the other hand might not be the only reason for the involvement in peace processes.[218] According to a study by Robert Dälsjö, in case of Sweden it is really a pragmatic policy. The hidden motive of Sweden's neutrality was driven from rationality and its primary purpose was to keep Sweden out of a new world war, should this occur.[219] Therefore such status and role from the perspective of Sweden and Norway themselves can be understood as a mean and explained by rational choice or neoclassical realism perspectives, where state's decisions come from the need for survival and at the same time are subject to domestic constraints. s Dälsjö explains, even when this "small-state realism" was once in a while turned toward "small-state idealism", the caution and reserve still reigned.[220] Only recently the idealist paradigm has started to change and Sweden has turned away from pure neutrality. Their parliament Rijksdag adopted a declaration that on the one hand declares non-membership to military alliances, but on the other declares not to be passive when the EU member or a Nordic country suffers an attack. At the same time help is expected when such attack should be taken place against Sweden. In 2016 the government adopted a "Memorandum of Understanding", a bill which aims to ensure that Sweden is a host country to NATO´s military exercises, or military operations on their territory.[221] At the same time Sweden sees essential to hold its neutral image in foreign policy not being a member of military alliances.[222]

To pose the question in another words, is the role and status building an end in itself or is it a mean for bigger purposes? Small states motives may differ from those of the great powers in the sense

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[218] Thune H., Ulriksen S., "Norway as an Allied Activist - Prestige and Pennance through Peace", Norwegian Institute of International Affairs publication Dec 2002, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27240/637.pdf

[219] Dälsjö R., "The Hidden rationality of Sweden's policy of neutrality during the Cold War", in journal Cold War History, 2014 vol 14, issue 2, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.765865, p178

[220] ibid, p180

[221] according to text by the Swedish ambassador to NATO, Håkan Malmqvist, available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/sweden-and-nato-23-years-down-the-road-defence-security/EN/index.htm

[222] Wallström speech, http://www.government.se/speeches/2018/02/the-governments-statement-of-foreign-policy-2018/

that small states are occupied with building reputation and recognition from the great power, which generates goodwill and raises the possibility that the USA and NATO will support them against external threats.[223] To bring an analogue of the reasoning, the argument is that small Nordic states also do not just get involved in facilitation and mediation as an end in itself, but it has a strong reasoning that rather is explained by the realist theories of international relations. As it was brought out, the status can often be transferred to more tangible results. From the negative side, this has not recently been a case. For example, Norway's status and being a close ally to the US has not helped when the US administration was deciding the trade tariffs. Norway's close ties to and, some argue, de facto inclusion in the EU apparently carried no weight with the Trump Administration. Nor did the much-hyped status of the US and Norway as "close allies," fellow members of NATO or a wave of political superlatives about the "excellent relations" and "close ties".[224]

Thune and Ulriksen from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs have dedicated a separate study on this perspective. They acknowledge that the explanations for motivation to act as peacemakers have differed from one extreme to another.[225] Using an offensive realist-inspired framework, it is explainable that the Nordic countries' international engagement reflects a more instrumental and strategic motivation rather than a moral one. Their engagement could be seen as a vehicle for a status strategy that helps them improve their status or consolidate their reputations as loyal allies and partners. The claim from this perspective is that the status-seeking is not an end in itself. It still is a puzzle piece of realpolitik.[226] The 1989 White Paper of Norway´s foreign policy also centered on the claim that security could not be viewed in isolation from global challenges. Norway's global engagement to help people in crisis was considered a tool in safeguarding its own security and prosperity as it serves an aim for the survival. This, for the small state, as one having been occupied and cannot be sure of its faith in an anarchic world order, is crucial helping to maintain long-term prosperity and survival. Skanland at the same time brings out a concern how this motivation behind the engagement affects negatively the constructed discourse of neutral peace-loving nations. He refers that actually the self-interest and altruism can go hand in hand, so that altruism, solidarity, charity and the moral duty to are combined with instrumental self-interested motivations. From the experience of Norway, it seems that the most effective public-diplomatic approach is to present national policy as

[223] Pedersen B. R., "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-seeking Strategies?" in journal International Peacekeeping, 2018, Vol 25, Issue 2, https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/13533312.2017.1394792
[224] http://www.newsinenglish.no/2018/03/23/norway-caught-in-trumps-trade-war/
[225] Ulriksen and Thune study, p3
[226] see also Skanland study "Norway is a Peace Nation" p36-37 on argumentation of realist perspective

serving the 'global good', benefiting humanity as a whole, even if it is prompted by a country's self-interest or reflecting its self-concept.

Ulriksen and Thune especially point out the altruist part and the importance of self-conception for their foreign policy decisions. They argue that neither the view of the essentialists highlighting national interests, nor the geopolitical and systemic focus of the structuralism present credible explanations. Instead, they say that '*Norwegian foreign policy is about the creation, maintenance and enhancement of a role or an identity whose main function is to gain recognition, attention and contact in order to maximize international influence*'.[227]

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When neutrality had appeared in Sweden's and Norway's national consensus, their policies of peace facilitation were more or less derived from this principle. While first it might have been just an obvious choice, today it is already a strategic approach. From contribution to scientific studies, to aid, mediation and other missions, both states have acted according to that image, over and over recreating their identity. The model of a status as a small state and confidence in its impartiality and capacities produced the same image and did not go unnoticed to the conflicting parties. The fact that Norway lacks "big sticks" serves as a plus in terms of image and developing trust.[228] Sweden's and Norway's foreign policy decisions as well as other actors' were influenced by these perceptions. This makes the social constructivist approach to their success the most applicable. At the same time it was discovered that the decision to be neutral might at first have been considered as a factor for a survival, which is better explained through structuralism and realism perspectives.

[227] see Henrikson, p75

[228] See Kelleher and Taulbee "Bridging the gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style, journal Peace and Change, vol 31 no 4, 2006, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2006.00388.x

3.3 Success of Sweden and Norway as mediators - findings from cases

So far, the analysis and abstraction was made from previous studies and books what international relations researchers how the image as peace nations were built being the main reasons for success of Sweden and Norway as mediators. It was explained in the introduction and methodological guidelines, this approach will be followed by a second step - a study of specific cases. In this subchapter several of them - nine to be exact - will be studied. Sweden and Norway have been involved as mediators and peace facilitators in handful of cases, therefore only a selection of those are covered. For example, Norway had a central role as a mediator for example the so-called Oslo Process in 1993 and the Sri Lankan civil war in 2002. Sweden has been involved in conflict between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s and had a role also for Israel and Palestine. In some cases, both have been in action. Through these and other cases it is possible to examine the research question to find out how they were chosen, and make observations who could and are allowed to participate in peace negotiations. The basis for the selection is to have both of the states more or less evenly divided and also to have a historical time-frame covered in balance. This would help to see first how the selecting procedure has been developed, what have been the reasons and how gradually the status, role and image have been constructed. Concerning the timeline, obviously the most recent cases could not have been selected, because of not enough data or material is available yet.[229]

The primary resources like the UN official material, governments' reports and also scientific articles were used for this particular part of the study. From each of these materials the concentration was on the specific point when, how and why the mediator was selected or a mandate given. Therefore, it is not an aim to give an exhaustive overview of the cases, as it would require a separate research for each one of them. Still, in order to understand the main reasons and defend the main statement, general facts and key figures are laid out about each conflict.

3.3.1 Sweden's role in Vietnam War

During the early years of the Vietnam War, 1965-1968, Sweden tried through intensive diplomatic methods, to persuade USA and North Vietnam to get behind a negotiating table. Both sides refused to talk directly to each other, therefore Sweden tried to use a secret channel and act as a messenger.[230] In many ways it was effective, while many messages were delivered through Sweden as intermediary. Somehow Sweden was accepted in this role while not being an outsider-neutral to the conflict, as

[229] e. g. recently, from March 2018, Sweden seems to be closely related to the developments between the US and North-Korea. Even more recently the top UN representatives, including Secretary General and the ambassadors of the states of the Security Council met in informal gathering in southern Sweden to discuss developments both in Korean Peninsula and in Syria.

[230] Bjerfeld U., "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics 1945-90", 1995, see the reference above

many theorists would argue being a prerequisite for the acceptance. Sweden had just showed strong criticism to the US for its war in Indochina. Bjerfeld classifies Sweden in the role of a mediator as outsider-partial.[231]

A study shows that Sweden was affected though by its role. It significantly lowered its criticism during the active role as a bridge-builder in the conflict. The role was dismissed in February 1968, because the US State Secretary Dean Rusk responded negatively to the messages delivered by Sweden. The criticism grew considerably after that.[232] This apparently did not help to get back such position. The importance of impartiality as a mediator is also seen from a report by Swedish MFA in 1966, which declares that a disadvantage of Sweden bridge-building was that its government had to be moderate in its official statements about Vietnam War participants. According to documents from the US side though, the US leaders were suspicious due to criticism, but did not hesitate to use Sweden as a messenger.[233]

The lesson to learn from the case is that, while impartiality might not be the most important factor in finding a successful solution to the conflict, it is nevertheless important to acquire a mediator's role and to keep the conflict parties unsuspicious about intermediary's efforts. Sweden's efforts as a bridge-builder between the US and North Vietnam restrained and cautioned them making official statements during the sensitive phases of the conflict. When Sweden stepped aside from its neutral role and explored a path of a criticizer, it affected its image and prestige being considered as a neutral small power.

3.3.2 Moderate and impartial Sweden in Iraq and Iran war mediation

In the interstate war between Iran and Iraq, the disputing parties accepted Swedish opposition leader at the time Olof Palme to facilitate authoritative communications between the parties at the onset of the conflict. Although there were high degrees of hostility and fear between the parties, the acceptance of mediation was not a question under dispute.[234] During 1980-1986 Sweden's opposition leader and later the Prime Minister Olof Palme was assigned as the UN Secretary-General's special representative in the war between Iraq and Iran. There were five mediation missions during 1980 to 1982. After that permanent contacts were maintained with the conflict parties.

In this mediating effort, Palme showed a respect as a tactical skill, and made compulsory to his team to read Qur'an and other Islamic culture. He was aware that in order to contribute effectively,

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[231] ibid, p30; see theory on insider, outsider and partiality in mediation in the second chapter
[232] ibid, p31
[233] ibid,
[234] Melin & Svensson p150

the team must possess a high level understanding about fundamental characterss in the dispute. It must be knowledgeable about conflict roots and history and culture. This helped to create trust and confidence in mediator during the negotiations.[235]

From this role as an intermediary, the importance of moderation on partiality by a state was clearly seen. Before taking the active role as a mediator, Sweden had not taken active stance or chosen sides of the conflict. But as much as it was done, according to the Bjerfeld study, from 1978 to 1988 Swedish criticism of Iran and Iraq continuously diminished. It was especially noticeable during Olof Palme was combining the mediation with the role of being the Prime Minister. At the time either sides were rarely criticized. Sweden remained very moderate about the war, especially there were no statements made of which side was to be blamed for the conflict.[236] Sweden went even that far with the neutrality that during its 37th session in October 1982 UN General Assembly discussions and voting on declaration, it refrained from participation. The resolution was not specifically aimed at the critique of either side, reflecting only the damage produced, endangering the international security, affirming the necessity of a ceasefire, and call upon the states to abstain from further actions.[237] In spite of that, Sweden found, its Prime Minister being the special representative, not being correct to debate neither vote.

According to Bjerfeld, Swedish criticism was relatively mild even when Iraq used chemical weapons during the conflict. They would have been much more emotional and sharper, had it not been mediating mission by the Prime Minister. Sweden apparently chose to prioritize the mission by Palme, instead of endanger its image with critique. Therefore, a great restraint of official critical statements was shown from Sweden during the mediated negotiations between Iran and Iraq. It avoided to formulate a standpoint on the war, by itself and as part of international community. Sweden being unable to condemn the cruelties of the conflict show that moderation is the price which a state must be willing to pay in order to act as a mediator. Otherwise the identity is not constructed, or the status and image maintained to be considered as a neutral and impartial in the eyes of the conflict parties.

Shortly after the war the importance of the impartiality was shown in an example where Sweden was not allowed to participate as a peace facilitator. In January 1989, Sweden was enthusiastic to participate in the UN mission in Namibia, where an agreement was being made with South Africa. For Swedish policy leaders, seeing Sweden in a role of peacemaker, it seemed clear that

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[235] Eriksson, 2014

[236] Bjerfeld U., "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics 1945-90", 1995, p32

[237] the UN resolution 37/3, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/37/3

their country would take part of the UN Mission. Instead, it was not allowed to participate because they did not consider Sweden impartial in the conflict.[238] According to Ulf Bjerfeld, the main reason was Swedish critique toward South Africa, because of which the neutrality was seriously doubted. According to the study, South Africa had been the most criticized state by Sweden during 1947-1990, being attacked as much as the three following states (the Soviet Union, Israel and the US) combined.[239]

Therefore, even though the mandate to mediate was given by the UN, the argument is that the identity and image of Sweden played a key part at the time. Nevertheless the mandate, it had to be accepted by the sides. It is doubtful had the Prime Minister Palme been accepted if Sweden had shown more strictness toward either side or been overly critical about the conflict. An important aspect for acquiring the role of a mediator is to be moderate and impartial as the identity and neutral image normally attributed to mediator is at stake.

3.3.3 Guatemala[240]

Even before the Oslo Process from 1980 to 1997, Norway was a facilitator in the peace process in Guatemala. The Guatemalan insurgency lasted for 36 years while 15 peace agreements were signed during the time.[241] Norway's role started from providing development aid, continued with suggesting 'good offices', and helping to negotiate, initiating the UN MINUGUA mission and forming a "Friends of Alliance".[242] Three Norwegians - Petter Skauen of Norwegian Church Aid, Gunnar Stålsett of Lutheran World Federation, and Jan Egeland of the Foreign Ministry in Oslo - played highly significant roles in reaching the agreement between the government and guerilla movement. The private group Norwegian Church Aid had been working in Guatemala since 1976 and had good contacts on both sides of Central America's longest civil war. Peter Skauen, a regional representative of Norwegian Church Aid in Guatemala was the first key actor for Norway´s involvement in the peace processes. Norwegian Church Aid is a diaconal organisation working for global justice. Peter Skauen stated that an armed conflict in a country had hampered development to such a degree that the organization saw a pressing need to raise the issue of how to get a peace process on track. Norwegian Church Aid had been active already during the time of 1980–82, a period of massacres and extreme violence. They realized that peace was essential if they were to achieve anything at all in the country. During a visit to the cooperating partners, Petter Skauen presented a list of ideas for potential projects

[238] Bjerfeld U., 1995, p23
[239] according to table 1 in Bjerfeld study, p29
[240] see Kellehen and Taulbee https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2006.00388.x
[241] information from the UN website, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minuguabackgr.html
[242] see below for each specific reference

like wells, housing, agricultural projects and asked about the needs of the locals. The answer was "peace, no more violence, no more sudden death".[243] Guatemala's leftist rebels with whom the NGO had been in contact, wanted to have talks, so in 1989 the church group suggested contacting Gunnar Staalsett, then head of the Lutheran World Foundation and now a Lutheran bishop. Staalsett called the Norwegian Foreign Ministry about sponsoring and financing peace talks. "They said 'yes' right away on the phone. It's amazing, but that's the way a small country works," Staalsett said.[244]

Therefore, instead of Track I, active work by Norwegian Gunnar Stålsett, secretary-general of Lutheran World Federation, was crucial in bringing the parties together in Oslo in early 1990s.[245] The initial agreement for search for peace by political means was signed in Oslo on March 29th 1990.[246] Formal peace process through initiative of MINUGUA, with the help of "Friendly Alliance", including Norway, was carried through during 1994-1996. The final peace agreement was signed in the eve of 1996, December 29th. Considering this timeline from early initiatives to final agreement, it is clear that Norway´s engagement in Guatemala has been not short or occasional, but long-term. The economic situation was so deteriorated because of the violence, so that the first initiatives were concentrated on issues of development. From there, the humanitarian perspective was included and the peace process got under way. A long-term commitment and concentration also to development has been an important reason why Norwegian actors have become involved in a considerable number of peace processes.[247]

A local Guatemalan who was involved in the peace process in the early 1990s pointed out that Norway is accepted by bigger nations with its influence. Its behind-the-scenes role during peace negotiations has them access and influence with great powers, particularly with the United States.[248] High-level involvement in Guatemala and other peace processes by Norwegian actors brought the focus back to the humanitarian and development needs of the populations concerned. People in the countries in question have expressed their desire to see concrete results of the peace process: to be able to believe in it and continue to support it.[249]

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[243] according to the official report of Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its peace processes,available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210674-rapp204.pdf, p9

[244] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/04/21/the-descendants-of-vikings-are-now-raiders-for-peace/c57a84e7-94d6-45ee-8d9b-b787cad14c5a/?utm_term=.c6f3219719fd

[245] Norway's MFA report, see above, p10

[246] The agreement available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_900330_OsloAgreement.pdf

[247] Norway´s MFA report, see above, p9-10

[248] According to Kelleher A., "A Multilevel approach…", see above

[249] see the Norway´s MFA report, p10

The lesson to learn from this peace process and Norway´s facilitative and continuous engagement through network of individuals, organizations and institutions from early stages to final agreement. As Greig and Regan argued, mediation is often offered to third-party actors that have special historical or other links with a conflicting party.[250] The Guatemala case and also others, as it is seen, proved this notion. The active involvement of Norway´s NGO-s already in the stages of violence was important, starting from the development aid, gradually going to humanitarian help, establishing contacts with key actors and working toward bringing everyone behind the table. It turned out as a continuous effort that Norway as a state did not let slip out of hand, being involved as long as the time was ripe for providing good offices. By that time the trust had been established and it was natural that Norway was accepted and included by the parties to help reaching the agreement.

The context of Guatemala, Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka processes have also used to explain the development and importance of constructed discourse of Norway as a peace nation. Skanland underlines that it is not well understood how it enabled an expansion in peace efforts. He explains that media coverage of Norwegian Middle East involvement crystallized around discursive constructions, resulting in the emergence of a very positive representation of Norwegian peace efforts. This remained dominant and supplied the interpretative lens through which other Norwegian peace initiatives were seen, added to the status and perceived importance. The dominant representation was important precondition for the expansion, consolidation and institutionalization of the peace engagement.[251] The previous success of the peace efforts in Guatemala, and later in Sri Lanka cemented and confirmed the representation, thus adding to its strength within the discourse. Also according to Egeland, The Oslo Agreement, the Guatemala Agreements, and efforts in South Africa, Balkan, showed that little Norway may play a role that the super powers cannot in a range of different situations, and how it has played such a role clearer than any other small nation, ever in world history.[252] Being a key actor in Guatemala process as well as in many other, he explains Norway´s success in confidentiality, close personal contacts, confidence from and access to the parties, and absence of Norwegian vested interests: "*We were, in contrast to the great powers, not seen as a state with other purposes than creating peace. Nobody attributed economic or strategic motives to us*."

3.3.4 Oslo Peace Process

Oslo peace process – Norway's effort at peace mediation between the Israelis and Palestinians expressed in the Oslo Accord of 1993 – is perhaps Norway's most known national diplomatic effort.

[250] see Greig and Regan study in which the authors specifically concentrated on civil-war, not interstate conflicts
[251] Skanland "Norway is a Peace Nation",, p37
[252] See Skanland reference to Egeland, p39

Not only is it probably most known and studied, it appears to be very influential for Norway in relation to the international status and role as a peacemaker. The image built with the secret back channel, appeared to be influential for involvement in peace processes later. As the peace process has been extensively studied, currently the focus will be mainly on the object of the research - the moment and developments that led to their assignment.

The development toward the assignment as a mediator in this peace process started to develop partly outside the official sphere. Even though Norwegian politicians had long maintained close and friendly relations with their Israeli colleagues, the key factor was a link was involving academic researchers, that led from being a low-key facilitator to an active mediator and resulted in the opening of the first highly secret Oslo channel. [253]

Terje Roed-Larsen, a Norwegian academic, was studying living conditions in Palestinian areas when he and his wife, diplomat Mona Juul, realized that Israelis and Palestinians were seeking a way out of their 40-year conflict. Roed-Larsen, now U.N. peace envoy for the Middle East, received support from Norway's government for more than a year of secret talks between Israel and the Palestinian leadership that led to the Oslo agreement in August 1993. Shortly before that Madrid Peace Conference talks had lagged because the PLO was excluded from the table. With the coincidence suddenly secret talks were suggested with the help of the scientists. From the marginalized Palestinian perspective, the Norwegian setting would bring them back to centre stage and would give Arafat complete and direct control over the Palestinian side in the negotiations. The Norwegian government had approved and eagerly backed the talks: Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland briefly attended the first meeting and Mona Juul, Larsen's wife and one of the key Norwegian players, was herself a diplomat and worked in the Foreign Minister's secretariat. The Norwegians saw themselves first not as mediators but as facilitators. Apparently, they never interfered in the negotiations and sometimes even were not present. The contribution consisted of getting the parties together, booking flights and hotels, paying the bills, arranging meetings and, not least, keeping the negotiations going and secret. The Norwegians achieved total secrecy for the talks, which were mainly held in isolated locations where the participants had to spend most of their time with each other. They offered 'good offices' to promote trust between the two sides. This so-called 'Oslo spirit' involved providing shelter, a small-group setting, food, drinks, and outdoor walks - offering an informal and cozy atmosphere that would foster the development of friendships between the main players. The emphasis was on breaking down stereotypes, smoothing over existential obstacles, clearing

[253] Waage H. H., "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent", journal of Palestine Studies, vol 34 no.4, 200, available at JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.6

misunderstandings, and overcoming a lack of willingness to talk. The effectiveness of this approach was soon clear.[254]

In April 1993, the talks became official and Norway took an active role of a mediator. Norway had just appointed a new foreign minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, an ambitious and gifted analyst and brilliant formulator who immediately made clear his intention to play an active role, with a hands-on. The Israelis appreciated the efforts of the Norwegians and in particular that of Holst. Holst was not only the messenger, passing on to the Palestinians what the Israelis told him to pass on, but also the formulator. After months of negotiations, the delicate final questions were solved during eight hours of phone calls between Stockholm and Tunis on 18 August. Two days later, the Israelis, Palestinians, and Norwegians initialled the agreement in a secret ceremony in Oslo in the middle of the night.[255]

This shows the dedication Norway is willing to put in to find peace. Such efforts will not be unnoticed. Alan Henrikson shows the importance of provided confidentiality during Oslo Accords. It was assured almost physically, because of the geographical remoteness of Norway in Europe's northern periphery.[256] In the case of the Oslo process on Israel/Palestine, the Norwegian government helped the process by providing confidential meeting places and skilled facilitators to maintain a conducive atmosphere, in which unexpected breakthroughs became possible.

Chester Crocker emphasizes that in the Oslo process a small country like Norway was able to play the role of third-party facilitator because it was perceived by both parties as neutral and impartial; Norway did not seek to assume the role of fully-fledged "mediator" and did not seek the mandate to do so.[257] Skanland says momentum for Norway success was built with Oslo process. Supported by the momentum gathered from the accolade that Norway was earning, a policy of substantial international peace engagement was adopted. Norway became involved in an increasing number of peace and reconciliation processes, and peace promotion was elevated to an important part of its foreign policy.[258]

First it might have seemed odd that a small remote country on the periphery of Europe and culturally far from the Middle East would be interested and accepted by the sides. Still, Norway's advantages as a mediator become clear. A small and powerless state has incentives to promote international peace and cooperation, and in so doing it acquires influence and prestige and a role on the world stage.[259] Waage pointed out that the most important was its acceptability to both sides.

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[254] see Waage,
[255] ibid,
[256] See Henriksen, p80
[257] Bullion, p77
[258] see Skanland "Norway is a Peace Nation", referred above, p35
[259] Waage H. H., p7

Norway had traditionally been one of Israel's best friend and its neutrality led to being one of the latest to establish contacts with the PLO. In spite of that it was precisely Norway's close ties with Israel and the United States, and its reputation for "decency," that made the Norway option attractive to the PLO.[260]

For Israel and Palestine, Norway and its representatives happened to be in the right place at the right time. From there on it offered places to meet, facilitated the process and ensured secrecy. The parties knew that Norway does not have a stake in the substance of the agreement, that Norway offered ideas and provided circumstances first, rather than advice. The upgrading of the talks and the revised Israeli demands seemed inevitably to require a different kind of third party assistance. The talks became official and Norway took on a lot more active role. Fortunately they also had the capability to fulfil this part. Because of the trust established by the parties, the assignment has continued for more than two decades. Because of the political consensus on promotion of peace and facilitation on talks in conflicts, the assignments have been able to be long-term, continuing through decades, without being influenced by the changes of Norwegian governments.

3.3.5 "The Stockholm Back Channel"

Stockholm Back Channel was the talks initiative between Palestine and Israel carried through with the help of Sweden from 1999 to early 2000´s. Leaving aside its relative unsuccess, the starting of the process nevertheless needs the examination in the context of current research. The Palestinian-Israel conflict dates back to early 1900s. The time when British prepared for self-rule of Arab Palestine while at the same time promising to create a national home for Jewish in the same country.[261] The conflict has proven highly resistant to all attempts of resolving. As it is also shown in the current study, high profile mediators and have tried and mostly failed, bringing only temporary ease to overall timeframe of the conflict. One of such efforts were made with the help of Sweden, which similar to the Oslo Peace Process was conducted in secrecy, as a back channel diplomacy. As it was explained in the previous chapter a 'back channel' is a name given to a secret, official negotiations among the parties to a dispute that supplement or replace open existing front channel negotiations.[262] The participators are not freelancers, they have accountability, official empowerment and leadership. Opposite would be Track II, people to people and informal negotiations.

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[260] ibid,

[261] Wanis-St John A., "Back Channel Negotiations", Syracuse Un. Press 2011, p1

[262] ibid, p4 Wanis-St John

Even though the Oslo Process was uncovered in the later stages, back channel negotiations were always on the map after 1993 Accords.[263] Rebirth of such meetings started in Norway, but from April 2000 three of such meetings were taking place in Stockholm. This has been known today as a 'Stockholm channel'. It started apparently when Swedish government offered 'good offices' to the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel.[264] Sweden's credibility has been high in the eyes of the Palestines due to its long-standing engagement, the permanent presence of the Consulate General in Jerusalem and recognition of the State of Palestine. This image had been used to support Palestinian state-building. Activities have been flexible and adapted to political developments.[265] Sweden had contributed to reforms, development aid and growth of equality in Palestine, which even more gave prestige to their status.

The back channel initiative's effectiveness was considered to be low because of rivalries among Palestinian top negotiators. It did not do any good either that during one session in May 2000 the back channel leaked to the press, which led to additional confrontation and distrust between the parties. In spite of that, Sweden was able to convince the sides, including the US Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, to meet in another session in the same month.

Unfortunately the Palestine-Israel conflict has stagnated after this stint of back channel negotiations. All contacts from then on have been mostly about ad-hoc attempts to deescalate the violence, implement previously agreed commitments or pragmatic discussions.[266] Recent years' developments in the Middle East with the war in Syria, emergence of ISIS and decisions by the US president Donald Trump, have not been helpful for the solution either. The US as a biased main third actor and current reached deadlock at the same time could be just enough 'ripe moment' for a neutral party once again step between the sides.

3.3.6 Mediation for Sri Lanka

According to Melin and Svensson, facilitation to Sri Lankan peace process did not evolve easily. The Sinhalese government did not accept foreign involvement in what it considered a domestic issue for 17 years.[267] Sinhalese nationalist forces even criticized Norwegian mediation efforts for intruding to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.[268] In a post re-election BBC interview with George Arney broadcast in December 1999, Kumaratunga revealed that first the Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka

[263] ibid, p12
[264] ibid, p216
[265] Sweden MFA report, "Strategy for Sweden's international development cooperation with Palestine 2015–2019"
[266] ibid, p5
[267] See Melin & Svensson, p 250
[268] ibid

Anyaoku, and subsequently the Norwegian government had been approached since mid-1997 as potential mediators in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Anyaoku facilitated informal talks lasting some 18 months with the Tigers, according to Kumaratunga. However, the failure of these, as with previous attempts involving France, Britain and several other countries, led to contacts in September 1999 and February 2000 with representatives from Norway, facilitated in London by LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham. Norway was originally approached by the Kumaratunga government as a facilitator, and its role has since had approval from regional actors like India, global actors like the US and Britain, and domestic protagonists such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, it has also encountered considerable opposition from local forces such as sections of the Sinhalese clergy and the ultranationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. An estimated 64,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed and over 800,000 wounded in Sri Lanka's bloody conflict since July 1983, when fighting erupted in the northern Jaffna peninsula between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. It is reckoned that over 800,000 Tamil refugees have fled the island since then, with the flow to Europe, North America and Australasia still estimated to be reaching 15,000-18,000 people a year. Sri Lanka has a population approaching 19 million. Several attempts at reaching a lasting solution in Sri Lanka have been derailed by successive governments, majority Sinhalese opponents, and the LTTE itself. The Tigers are certainly on the defensive in both the domestic and international arenas, and the Norwegian-led peace process can certainly be seen as a strategy to improve the image of the movement both at home and abroad. The LTTE decision to enter into dialogue appears to come from a realisation that even while they cannot be defeated militarily, neither can they win at present on the battlefield. This kind of mutually hurting stalemate can provide ripe moments for negotiations to commence.[269] According to William Zartman, this occurs when the playing field is reasonably level to both sides and talks become possible. This usually also involves the presence of a valid spokesperson such as Norway for the parties, creating a perception to both parties that there is a way out. The primary role of the third party is to recognise the onset of ripeness and to act within that moment to encourage both parties to enter into negotiations.

The initial London meeting was followed in January 2000 with a delegation to Sri Lanka led by former Norwegian State Secretary for Development, Cooperation and Human Rights, Lere Lunde. Further talks were held in February 2000 in Colombo between former Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek and President Kumaratunga, who was accompanied by Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The next stage was talks held in Oslo in April 2000 between Tharmalingam

[269] Zartman W., "The Timing of Peace Initiatives:Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments" in "Contemporary Peacemaking" by Darby J., Mac Ginty R. (eds), Palgrave Macmillan 2008, p23-24

Sarvendra, Chief of the Tamil Coordinating Committee and Anton Balasingham from the LTTE, and Norwegian government officials, during which the revised devolution package and associated issues were discussed. This evolving process was not derailed by the change of government in Oslo at this time, due to a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy.[270] Erik Solheim, who was appointed special advisor to the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs on 30 March 2000, had already been working away behind the scenes on the Sri Lankan conflict for one year. He continued in this role, even though he was a member of the Socialist Left, which is a minority opposition party. There was a notable difference of perception, though, between the various protagonists, with the president favouring "good offices" and facilitation at most, while the LTTE insisted Norway taking the role of mediator.

Svensson and Höglund bring out that the most distinct difference between the peace process mediated by Norway and all previous attempts to solve the conflict, was that for the first time there was an independent mediator who has both parties' confidence.[271] The Norwegian policy to mediation in case of Sri Lanka was again based on impartiality, emphasizing ownership of the process by the primary parties, and seeking a high degree of internationalization. Seeing the other side of the same coin, Norway was selected as a mediator because the parties saw it as an unbiased intermediary, which had the potential to gain access to both sides.[272] Norway had engaged with Sri Lanka previously through several development projects and thus it was a well-known actor.

Norway has specifically for its peacebuilding capacities established the Oslo-based International Peace Research Institute which as the world's first peace institute in 1959. The institute has been involved in support to facilitate negotiations, organizes many workshops on disputes. For instance, PRIO organised two consultations involving participants from Sri Lanka and elsewhere during 1988 and 1989, which were regarded as a valuable example of how a respected institutional base can be used to mount dialogue initiatives.[273] Norway has also been involved in several development and social service projects in Sri Lanka through agencies such as Cey-Nor, Worldview, Redd Barna and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. As a small Scandinavian country lacking specific geopolitical and ex-colonial interests, Norway sees itself as well placed to act as an impartial third-party mediator in such conflicts in other parts of the world outside of Europe. Furthermore, as a wealthy country which benefits from substantial oil and fishing revenue, its contributions to foreign aid are the best in the world, at over 1% of the GDP. However, Norway's role

[270] same referred in the book Norway's status: even though prime minister saw Norway's role differently, the first thing he was asked by foreign counterparts was about Sri Lanka.
[271] Höglund K., Svensson I., "The peace process in Sri Lanka" in journal Civil Wars, Issue 4, Volume 5, 2002, available at https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/13698240208402519, p112
[272] See Lehti, p60
[273] Bullion A., p77

as a mediator could have had also motives other than idealism. The country is home to a sizeable Tamil refugee population of over 10,000, many of whom work in the fishing industry. Norway is likewise mindful of gaining kudos on the international stage, in order to enhance its standing at the United Nations and other fora.[274]

Norway was partly accused to have been influenced by the Norwegian Tamil Diaspora and due to no strictness to terrorism and holding a sympathetic attitude towards non-state actors. Even with these challenges Norway's involvement had considerable legitimacy in Sri Lanka, both regionally and internationally as renewed security interest after the 2001 September terrorist attack led the US to closely surveying developments in Sri Lanka.[275] Norway had recently changed government and its new Prime Minister Jan Petersen was several times approached by foreign counterparts, including the British Jack Straw and the US Colin Powell with requests to go on with the Sri Lanka peace process. This even came as a surprise to the conservative Prime Minister Petersen who had seen Norwegian role on the international scene too costly and even considered diminishing the role as a peacemaker. Hearing the Sri Lanka process as the first question being asked during his international meetings, he realized the golden role Norway actually had.[276] Therefore, in addition to local support, Norway filling the role of a peacemaker, has a strong the international backing.

3.3.7 Mediation in Sudan

Sudan is one of the world's poorest countries, in which around half the population lives below the international poverty line of less than USD 1.90 per day. The conflicts in Sudan come from unequal distribution of power, lack of respect for human rights, limited access to basic public services such as education and health care, competition for natural resources, food and water insecurity, easy access to weapons and local disputes between different groups.[277] Norway had a significant role in reaching the agreement in 2002 and 2005, between the government and Sudan´s Liberation Movement.[278] Those being involved in the Sudan peace process, have credited Norwegians skilfully continuing behind-the-scenes conversations and keep the difficult process going: "Norwegians were always available in hard and critical times", said Salah El Guneid, Minister in Sudan's Embassy to the USA.

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[274] ibid,

[275] Höglund and Svensson, p112

[276] according to Carvalho and Lie in "Small State Status-Seeking", referring to Hagvaag E. in Dagbladet 12.10.2002

[277] Sweden MFA report, Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Sudan 2018–2022

[278] Kelleher A., "A Small State's Multiple-level Approach to Peacemaking: Norway's Role in Achieving Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement", in journal Civil Wars, 2006, vol 8, issue 3-4, available at https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/13698240601060686

When necessary, Norway did not back of from funding meetings and paying travel costs of relevant participants. According to El Guneid, Norway is spending a lot more than it is earning in Africa.

Ann Kelleher, having studied Norway's engagement in Sudan peace process, brings out that small powers like Norway can develop their distinctive mediation capabilities based on attributes derived from its smallness. With a homogeneous population of 4 million people and oil wealth enabling to enjoy a high standard of living, Norwegians have often characterized their domestic political system as consensus creation rather than confrontation. They are accustomed to spending the time it takes to sort out strongly held convictions.[279] Important part of Norway´s success getting the role of a mediator in Norway, was to their contacts in religious spheres. Norway used their capabilities of track 1 ½ connection, which was described in the second chapter. According to Kelleher and Johnson, vibrant grassroot people-to-people peace process was a prelude to leading formal peace agreement between North and South of Sudan.[280] Kelleher emphasized the involvement of mid-level actors in Sudan, which in addition to the grassroot level, brought multiple layers to the peace process.[281]

The key factors for getting involved in Sudan, started first for Norway from 1993, when IGAD (InterGovernmental Authority on Development) initiated a peace process, first led by Kenya. States outside Africa, Norway, the US and the UK, became actively involved as the Friends of IGAD, with Norway being the leader of the group. Sudan conflicting parties saw especially Norway as a non-threatening mediator, with no direct interest in Sudan, any other than its long history of humanitarian aid partnerships. The Sudan government reported that ”Norwegians had no direct interest and so were very acceptable, indeed appealing to both parties. They were perceived as not having intentions in the Sudan”[282]. In addition, Norwegians had developed a reputation for being able to keep negotiations secret throughout the Oslo Channel for Israeli – Palestinian talks. In Sudan therefore, Norwegians were needed for both parties to transmit confidential information that they could not say to each other directly at first stages in the talks.[283]

Norway's involvement is explained also through their extensive knowledge of field experience, including in Sudan. According to Kelleher, many Norwegians have had overseas

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[279] Kelleher A., Taulbee L., “Building Peace Norwegian Style: Studies in Track 1 ½ Diplomacy” in Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond “Subcontracting Peace – the Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding, Ashgate Publishing 2005 p70

[280] Kelleher A., Johnson M., “Religious Communities as Peacemakers: A Comparison of Grassroots Peace Processes in Sudan and Northern Ireland”, in journal Civil Wars, vol 10, 2008, issue 2, available at https://doi-org.ezproxy.vdu.lt:2443/10.1080/13698240802062705

[281] Kelleher is referring to J. P. Lederach theoretic approach of the need for multiple layers involvement in peace processes, in “A Small State´s Multiple Level Approach…”, see above;

[282] according to el Guneid in Kelleher article

[283] Kellehen A., “A Multiple level approach..”, see above

experience and have worked intensively with international counterparts. Norway can then field a formidable team to help making policy decision to become involved in conflicts in which its citizens have particular expertise and personal contacts. Field experience needs to exist with actors at the multiple levels combining his approach with the concept of capabilities. Field experience implies applying relevant knowledge in interacting with parties in the conflict. The experience proved to be pivotal as the former US Senator John Danforth needed to stop in Oslo for a briefing on his way to Sudan after receiving his appointment by President Bush as the US Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan.[284]

In Sudan, Norway had developed a trusted network of people from the top to local levels in Sudan´s south and north. The contacts were built with the help of Norwegian People's Aid and Norwegian Church Aid. Norway developed a long-standing personal relationships with individuals of key positions - in Sudan's government, opposition, and local communities.[285] According to the official report of Norway´s MFA, this network through NGO´s ha an effect on the results. Norwegian People's Aid was involved in humanitarian efforts, while later on the Norwegian Church Aid proved to be key and particularly active in the peace process.[286] Overall, the key factors on which Norwegian engagement in Sudan depended on, coincide mostly with the conclusions from the case of Guatemala. Even though the people involved had changed by the time, the process followed a similar pattern. While in Guatemala this chain of events was not a strategy or tactics yet[287], by the time peace processes had finished in Sudan and also Sri Lanka, Norway had officially taken notice. Government policy paper on peacebuilding and development in 2002, already reflected on latest experiences of close relationship between involvement in development and high-level engagement in peace processes.[288]

Today both Norway and Sweden contribute to the area with development aid, initiating projects to fight for inequality. They are ready to promote more inclusive peace processes, sustainable use of resources, strengthen resilience to crises and work on confidence building measures. The strategy is already to engage early and through many development projects.[289] These measures would provide invaluable conditions for both states being accepted as facilitators to the conflict resolution when the time is ripe.

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[284] ibid,
[285] ibid,
[286] report, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210674-rapp204.pdf, p10
[287] Skånland H. Ø., "'Norway is a peace nation'", 2010, p35
[288] ibid, p11
[289] MFA reports of strategy on Sudan

3.3.8 Columbia peace talks with FARC-EP and ELN

The violent conflict in Colombia has lasted now for more than 50 years. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, and more than six million have been forced to flee their homes. The historical root causes include poverty, social and economic injustice, inequitable and non-sustainable use of natural resources, lack of political representation, in combination with weak public institutions in the vast territory.[290] It has not been yet found a definite end to severe humanitarian consequences and great suffering to the civilian population. Both Sweden and Norway have been involved in peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia for several decades. The work has included a number of efforts to promote dialogue between a different governments and the Colombian guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (Farc-EP) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Today Sweden's initiatives involve mostly providing humanitarian aid, improve social conditions, including gender equality and contributing to facilitate dialogue between civil societies.

Norway, with the help of Cuba, has been official facilitators of the ongoing peace process between the Colombian Government and the Farc-EP. The peace talks were launched in Oslo in October 2012. According to the Norway´s government publishing, Norway and Cuba had facilitated secret exploratory talks between the parties already for a long time before with the aim of reaching an agreement on a framework for the negotiations.[291] Norway has had regular contact with each of the parties to the conflict, and provides support in difficult situations, and in general uses its expertise and experience to make suggestions. The peace process was launched in Oslo and continued with negotiations. The final peace agreement was signed in Cartagena on 26 September 2016, but disappointingly a narrow majority of voters in a referendum on 2 October rejected it. This led to additional talks on the peace agreement both between the parties to the conflict and also with other sectors of Colombian society. The final agreement was signed and ratified by the Senate and House of Representatives by the end of the same year.

Norway has been an initiator of other engagements related to the conflict. In February 2016, Norway and the US launched an anti-landmine initiative to intensify humanitarian efforts and to make Colombia mine-free by 2021. Norway announced a contribution of 18 million euros in three years to support the clearance as it is one of priority areas in its role as facilitator of the peace process. Other priority areas are the women, peace and security agenda and transitional justice.[292] Some of these

[290] Sweden MFA report "Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia 2016–2020

[291] https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/

[292] ibid,

confidence-building measures are carried through with the help of Norwegian People's Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Another measure is the joint effort to find and identify the remains of people who disappeared during the conflict. It has been seen and shown also in this research, how the different initiatives by NGO´s have paved the way to active involvement also at the negotiating table. Norway´s help as a peace facilitator has depended on such measures and it is very likely that the role Norway is putting itself in, will help them to continue mediation if this would be necessary in the future.

The success of negotiations with Farc opened path to talks with other military groups. Norway was first the assistant throughout two years of exploratory talks between the Colombian government and the ELN. This led to an agreement on 30 March 2016 to start formal peace negotiations. The breakthrough was achieved and Norway was asked to continue as facilitator together with Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The negotiations started in February 2017 with the help of Norway which resulted in temporary ceasefire agreement in September. The agreement and further talks unfortunately were halted in less than a year when the ELN exploded a bomb killing 5 policemen and left over 40 others wounded.

There are six items on the agenda, which emphasises the importance of active civil society participation when negotiating issues such as democracy and social change for peace. The rights of victims will be a key focus area. The parties agreed on a temporary bilateral ceasefire in September 2017. "*In the time ahead, it will be essential to ensure that the peace agreement with Farc is implemented, that former Farc soldiers are reintegrated into Colombian society, and that an agreement is reached between the Colombian Government and the ELN. These will also be the main priorities of Norway's efforts*," said Borge Brende. Norway has provided substantial financial support for the peace process in Colombia, and the Government is proposing to increase support for implementation of the peace agreement by NOK 50 million in 2018.

In Colombia regional actors and organizations took increasingly active role. It is needed to work with them because it is found that sustainable peace is not possible without regional actors being actively involved. Similar patterns were used in a way to mediation process as in Sudan and Guatemala, with the help of NGO's and relying on the image.

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Sweden's engagement was a subject to its neutrality and a strategic choice. Often Sweden stayed true to its image, instead of saying out loud all their other values. Capacity building had also served well for its status and prestige in the international scene. Their role can be characterized as "aggressive

good offices," rather than power mediation or shuttle diplomacy. Norway's engagement during the first part of the 1990's was almost always based on one pattern: initiatives were taken by well-placed individuals and NGO-workers, and these were then followed up by contacts and talks that also included representatives of states. Broad contacts and networking have been combined with more conventional approaches and competence has been backed up by the application of considerable financial means.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been argued throughout the research that the main reason for the success of Sweden and Norway being asked as mediators, was a result of their constructed identity, role, image and status on the international stage. Overall the statement held up to the findings. The identity had been built and several measures were taken to help to recreate it over again. These measures have helped the cause of adding to the identity as the main factor of their success:

1) Resources - the countries have made resources available for peace and reconciliation efforts. They have put flexible funding mechanisms in place for this purpose. The states have contributed considerable efforts on developmental aid to conflicting countries.
2) Scientific contribution - in building its role and status as peace mediators, both Norway and Sweden have dedicated many resources to the scientific research in their universities. Almost all scholars specializing in the field of mediation are affiliated either to Swedish or Norwegian Institutes. Swedish studies outnumber Norwegian ones. The strongest and most recourses go to the studies in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in the Uppsala University and the Lund University's Peace and Conflict studies. In Norway the research specializing in the field has located mainly in the University of Oslo, plus special institutes like the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Peace Research Institute Oslo analyse periodically mediation related themes.
3) Importance of the non-governmental organizations - especially in the early stages of their development as facilitators of dialogue, these organizations played a significant part. They gave the first access that might otherwise might have not taken place.
4) Being active at all levels, from Track 1 and 1 ½ to track 2 - Sweden and Norway use every level possible to facilitate a dialogue, when it is necessary to avoid further conflict.
5) Experience - while first the neutrality was more of a principle for foreign policy decision leading to mediation processes, soon, especially from the end of the Cold War, both states started to gain a lot of experience and raised their status through it.
6) Approvement of global allies and friends of mediation - the main power, the US has been a full supporter of Sweden and Norway in their efforts. Sometimes it would be even difficult for great powers to mediate themselves, because of their muscle and coercive nature, seen from the eyes of a conflict party. Their credibility and status was converted to power being accepted and asked to involve as mediators both by major powers or conflicting sides.
7) Historical connections to conflicting actors - Norway had personal connection with Sri Lanka, having amount of its refugees working in their oil industry. Sweden is the only western state that decided to remain their embassy in North Korea, while other democracies had withdrawn

their diplomatic ties. As it was seen mediation is often offered to third-party actors that have special historical or other links with a conflicting party.

8) Possessing of peaceful history - both states' have been expressively neutral for already 200 years and even before that did not explore the world as other colonial powers. Their efforts are not seen motivated by political or economic self-interest.
9) Strategy on pure mediation - either country has no military leverage and uses only facilitative strategy. They do not seek to pressure parties or force solutions. Wise assisting, encouraging and sometimes just a gentle is nutch needed. They assist the parties to a conflict in their efforts to find a peaceful solution, but the responsibility for this lies with the parties themselves. States lack "big sticks", emphasize their role as facilitators, which serves for their image and develops. Their role might be more accurately characterized as "aggressive good offices," rather than power mediation or shuttle diplomacy.[293]
10) Long-term solution approach - principle is not to look for quick fixes. Broad political consensus to dedicate to peace-processes, has abled to be considered as a reliable and predictable and patient partner. Sustainable peace depends on willingness of partners. If the sides are not in a win-win cooperative mode, ready to compromise, and consider only zero-sum approach, then there is no need for a mediator. Engagement by international community early not confrontation, is important factor.
11) Considering the international context - Their contributions are part of international efforts and guiding principle is partnerships. The states see the UN as an important partner for finding a success. They are encouraging UN to seize the opportunities of peacemaking. They have seeked for partnerships with other countries and organizations like the UK, the US, IGAD.
12) Importance of inclusiveness - they seek to be consistent advocates for inclusion of local communities and civil society. Critical role for them to ensure sustainable peace.. Inclusion of women important, while making up half of the population. They suffer the most and their concerns must be addressed in peace processes. Absence of women at the table means less discussion on issues affecting women and girls. In Afghanistan Norway speaks with women's organizations about their expectations for Afghan efforts with Taliban. Norway is helping these to strengthen their negotiations skills.

[293] See Kelleher and Taulbee "Bridging the gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style, journal Peace and Change, vol 31 no 4, 2006, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2006.00388.x

13) Considering the regional context - for each process the basics of mediation apply, but Sweden and Norway have made conscious effort to learn everything there is to know about the conflict and their parties, from history, culture to economic and social aspects.

The statement proposed as the main reason for their success - constructed identity, role status and image - proved to be correct overall. In different opinions and cases it appeared to be several specific reasons for acquiring the position of a mediator. Especially in the beginning of their career as peace promoters, the reasons were more random, without a special strategy. As the time went by and they grew more into their role, the image was built, national perception favoured this approach, the more they were selected due to this constructed image.

There is no mediator if one does not want to be involved. Therefore, looking at that side of the coin, the motivation by Sweden and Norway themselves appeared to be only partly related to the main statement. Even though, the nations have seen themselves as neutral ones for a longer time than most other states exist, their foreign policy decision of neutrality and peacemaking consensus could be explained also through the prism of rational choice and realism. The non-material idealism based altruism and the need for survival seems to go hand-in-hand when Sweden and Norway themselves consider being part of peace processes.

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The world might be in a need for mediation more than ever. Many ongoing conflicts in Asia, South-America and Africa have more than just regional importance. Within a week from the thesis deadline, on May 12th the US president is supposed to re-confirm the commitment to Iran nuclear deal. It is very likely, that the deal's life expectancy is short. While europeans have been trying to keep it in force, backing off by the US would again put a next obstacle to the once so strong Trans-Atlantic relations. Global actors like Russia, Turkey, the United States, and Iran cannot find a way for a political solution in Syria. Any activity there, might have world-wide implications. The second half of May we will most likely see the summit meeting between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump. An event with global implications for which already several intermediaries, including Sweden, have contributed. Whichever will be the result of these negotiations, the conflict at the highest level is possible - between great powers capable of destroying each other and more. Situations like these are in a need for a cool-headed and mindful interference. When the great powers play a major zero-sum game, the minor players are there with the assistance to see the world in more positive ways.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. The Cyprus conflict resolution as an example for development of mediation discipline[294]

Year	*Conflict events*	*Official interventions*	*Unofficial interventions*
1955	EOKA Campaign Apr. 55	Eden Plan Sept. 55 Harding Plan Jan. 56 Radcliffe Report 56	
	TMT Formation 57–58	Macmillan Plan June 58	
1960	Independence Aug. 60 (imposed)	Zurich Accords Feb. 59	
	Constitutional Breakdown Nov. 63	London Conference Feb. 64 (failed) Acheson Plan July 64 (rejected)	
	Intercommunal Violence Dec 63 UNFICYP Mar. 64		
1965		Galo Plaza Report Mar. 65 (rejected)	
	Provisional Cyprus-Turkish Admin Dec. 67		Burton Workshop Oct. 66 (return to negotiations)
		Intercommunal Talks 68–71 (inconclusive)	
1970		Intercommunal Talks 72–74 (precluded)	Talbot Seminar Nov. 73 (precluded)
	Coup d'Etat July 74 Turkish Intervention July, Aug. 74	Geneva Talks July, Aug. 74 (failed)	Doob Workshop July 74 (aborted)
1975	Turkish Federated State Feb. 75		
	Transfer of Populations Aug. 76	Makarios–Denktash Guidelines Feb. 77 Vienna Talks Mar. 77 (failed) ABC Plan Nov. 78 (rejected)	
		Ten-Point Agreement May 79	Kelman Workshop May 79 (pre-influentials)
1980		Intercommunal Talks 79–83 (inconclusive) Evaluation Paper Jan. 81 Aide Memoire Aug. 83	
	UDI of TRNC Nov. 83	Proximity Talks 84–86 (rejected Jan. 85) (failed Mar. 86)	Kelman Workshop May 84 (pre-influentials) Doob Meetings 85 (terminated)
1985		UN Mediation 88–90 (impasse)	
1990	EU Application May 90		Fisher Workshop Dec. 90 (Diaspora Influentials)
		Set of Ideas 91–92 (rejected)	Fisher Workshop June 91 (Influentials)
		Confidence-Building Measures 93–95 (failed)	Fisher Workshops May, June 93 (Educators)
1995			Cyprus Consortium Training 91–96 (Citizen Peacebuilders) Broome Training 94–96 (Citizen Peacebuilders)
	TRNC Integration Aug. 97–		
		UN Mediation 97 (impasse)	Intractability Workshops 97 (Influentials)
	EU Accession Talks Mar. 98– Missile Crisis 97–98	UN Shuttle Discussions	Brainstorming Workshops 99–00 (Influentials)
2000		UN Proximity Talks 99–00	

[294] Fisher R., „Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse“, in Journal of Peace Research, Sage Publications, 2001 Vol 38, pp307-326, p318, 323, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343301038003003

Annex 2. Norway´s engagement in peace processes since 1993[295]

Country	Norway's contribution
Afghanistan	Support for peace efforts and regional cooperation, including confidence-building measures in the Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process, aimed at strengthening regional relations and promoting common interests.
Colombia	Together with Cuba, official facilitator of the peace process with Farc-EP since 2012. Also facilitator of the peace process with ELN (together with Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela). Formal negotiations with ELN announced on 30 March 2016, following secret talks since 2014. Several decades' of involvement in peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia, and in various dialogue initiatives between the country's guerrilla groups (Farc-EP and ELN) and successive governments.
Guatemala	Norway played an active role as facilitator during the peace talks, and was a member of the Group of Friends for Guatemala, together with the US, Spain, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia - of the group of friends for Guatemala, which assisted the UN in its mediation efforts. Three partial agreements signed in Norway. Peace agreement signed in 1996.
Myanmar	Supported the ceasefires and helped to prepare the ground for a political process through the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative from 2012 to 2014. Continuing to support the ongoing peace process, for example through the Peace Donor Support Group.

[295] According to the official statement on the web page of MFA Norway https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/peace_efforts/id732943/

Nepal	Provided an informal meeting place for the parties to the conflict during the peace process. Support for UN assistance and monitoring efforts. Peace agreement signed in 2006.
Israel, Palestine	Facilitator for the negotiations in 1992–1993 that led to the Oslo Accords. In charge of the People-to-People Programme, established under the Oslo II agreement in 1995 to make the peace process more inclusive. Chair of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLC) since its establishment in 1993. Since the Oslo Accords, the AHLC has coordinated international financing for a large share of the Palestinian Authority's budgets.
The Philippines	Facilitator of the peace talks between the Government and the Communist movement CPP-NPA-NDFP since 2001. The peace talks were resumed in August 2016, after several years of stalemate. Participates in the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) in Mindanao in connection with peace process between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Somalia	Support for peace and reconciliation efforts. Founding member, with the US, of the International Contact Group.
Sri Lanka	Support for peace and reconciliation efforts from 1997 to 2009. Facilitator of peace negotiations between 2000 and 2006. Leadership of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission set up to monitor the ceasefire signed in 2002, until the abrogation of the ceasefire by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2008.

Sudan/South Sudan	Key actor in the peace process, with Special Representative to Sudan and South Sudan, and member of the Troika (Norway, US, UK) since 2002. Played a leading role in the negotiations leading to the peace agreement in 2005. Supported the Igad-led (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) negotiations that resulted in the Addis Ababa agreements between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012. Also supported the Igad-led negotiations following the internal conflict in South Sudan from December 2013 until the conclusion of the South Sudan peace agreement in August 2015.

Annex 3. Deep prevention methods of intrastate conflicts on different levels[296]

Table 2.1. Deep prevention methods of intrastate conflict	
Factors generating conflict	**Possible preventers**
Global level	
Inappropriate systemic structures	Changes in international order
Regional level	
Regional diasporas	Regional security arrangements
State level	
Ethnic stratification	Power-sharing/federalism/autonomy
Weak economies	Appropriate development
Authoritarian rule	Legitimacy, democratization
Human Rights abuse	Rule of law, HR monitoring and protection
Societal level	
Weak societies	Strengthen civic society and institutions
Weak communications	Round tables/workshops/community relations
Polarized attitudes	Cross-cultural work
Poverty, inequality	Poverty reduction and social reforms
Elite/individual level	
Exclusionist policies	Stronger moderates

[296]Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T., Miall H., 2015

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